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NONDELEGATION AND CRIMINAL LAW
F. Andrew Hessick* & Carissa Byrne Hessick**
Although the Constitution confers the legislative power on Congress,
Congress does not make most laws. Instead, Congress delegates the
power to make laws to administrative agencies. The Supreme Court has
adopted a permissive stance towards these delegations, placing
essentially no limits on Congress’s ability to delegate lawmaking power
to agencies.
In its recent decision, Gundy v. United States, the Court relied on this
unrestrictive doctrine to uphold a statute delegating the power to write
criminal laws. In doing so, the Court did not address whether greater
restrictions should apply to delegations involving criminal law.
Instead, it applied the same permissive test that it uses to evaluate other
types of delegations.
This Article argues that criminal delegations should be treated
differently. A number of legal doctrines distinguish criminal laws from
other laws. Examples include the vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity,
and the prohibition on criminal common law. The principles underlying
these exceptional doctrines equally support tighter restrictions on
criminal delegations. Moreover, the justifications in favor of permitting
delegations apply less forcefully to criminal laws. Accordingly, this
Article proposes that criminal law delegations be subject to greater
restrictions than other delegations.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the Supreme Court, the nondelegation doctrine forbids
Congress from delegating its Article I legislative power to administrative
agencies. But the doctrine has more bark than bite. Since 1935, the
Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the constitutionality of statutes
delegating regulatory power to agencies.1 These decisions have spawned
many critics who have argued against broad delegations.2

1
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (“Only twice in this country’s history
(and that in a single year) have we found a delegation excessive . . . .” (citing A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935))); Aditya Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor,
and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 165 (2019)
(“[S]ave for two exceptions, both of which occurred in 1935[, the Court] has not used the
nondelegation doctrine to find a statute unconstitutional.”).
2
David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People
Through Delegation 195–97 (1993); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va.
L. Rev. 327, 334 (2002) (arguing for a stronger nondelegation doctrine); Jonathan R. Macey,
Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application
to Constitutional Theory, 74 Va. L. Rev. 471, 513 (1988) (“Perhaps the greatest departure
from the system of government envisioned by the framers is the open-ended delegation of
legislative power to administrative agencies that began with the New Deal and continues to
this day.”); Sean P. Sullivan, Powers, But How Much Power? Game Theory and the
Nondelegation Principle, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1241 (2018) (calling the doctrine “limp”);
Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1006 (2015) (calling the
doctrine “toothless”).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Nondelegation and Criminal Law

283

During the October 2018 term, the Supreme Court decided to revisit a
particularly important nondelegation question: whether Congress can
delegate the power to set the scope of criminal laws. The issue arose in
Gundy v. United States, which presented the question of whether the Sex
Offender
Registration
and
Notification
Act
(“SORNA”)
unconstitutionally delegated power to the Attorney General to issue
regulations about how the Act’s requirements applied to offenders
convicted before the Act took effect.3
A fractured Court ultimately decided both to uphold the delegation and
not to modify the nondelegation doctrine.4 But the opinions strongly
hinted that the Court might revisit the doctrine in the future. Justice
Kagan’s opinion reaffirming the current doctrine garnered only four
votes. Justice Gorsuch’s opinion excoriating the current doctrine as
unconstitutional had three votes.5 And Justice Alito’s concurring opinion
explicitly indicated his willingness to revisit the doctrine in a future case.6
Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh, who did not participate in Gundy and
could have supplied the crucial fifth vote to refashion the nondelegation
doctrine, issued a statement dissenting from the denial of certiorari in a
later case, stating that Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent “raised important points
that may warrant further consideration in future cases.”7
The opinions in Gundy featured extensive analysis of the nondelegation
doctrine—its origins, its application, and its wisdom. But something
important was missing from those opinions: a discussion of the
importance of the criminal consequences flowing from the Attorney
General’s regulations. None of the opinions in the case asked whether
Congress’s ability to delegate policy decisions ought to be assessed
differently when the power being delegated is the power to determine the
scope of criminal laws.8
3

Gundy v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018) (granting certiorari on one of several
questions presented in petition for writ of certiorari).
4
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129–30.
5
Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined the
dissent.
6
Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If a majority of this Court were willing
to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”).
7
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (mem.). Justice Kavanaugh went out of his
way to make this statement, writing separately in a denial of certiorari for the express purpose
of noting that “Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation
doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.” Id. at 342.
8
Although he did not address the matter in Gundy, Justice Gorsuch argued that delegation
should apply differently to criminal laws when he was on the Tenth Circuit. See United States
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This omission is striking because there are many reasons to think that
the power to delegate is different when it comes to criminal laws.9 Indeed,
in previous opinions, the Court had explicitly acknowledged the
possibility that a different test ought to apply to delegations involving

v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 668–70 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
9
Scholarship on the nondelegation doctrine is vast. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109
Yale L.J. 1399, 1402, 1415–31 (2000) (suggesting a theory of nondelegation in which
procedural protections advance normative concerns about rule of law and accountability);
Lawson, supra note 2, at 345–51 (arguing that the text of Article I of the Constitution
constitutes a limitation on the delegation of the legislative power by Congress); Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721 (2002)
(arguing that nondelegation doctrine is no longer enforced; Sullivan, supra note 2 (using game
theory to evaluate the nondelegation doctrine). A smaller, but still significant, body of
scholarship addresses the interaction of the doctrine with criminal law. See Harlan S.
Abrahams & John R. Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative Crimes: A Study of
Irreconcilables, 1 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1, 9, 37–39 (1976) (arguing that the power to make crimes is
a core function of the legislature and thus cannot be delegated); Brenner M. Fissell, When
Agencies Make Criminal Law, 10 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 855, 880–906 (2020) (arguing that
criminal delegations are inconsistent with the political theories of punishment); Darrell A.
Fruth, Touby or Not Touby: The Constitutional Question When Congress Authorizes State and
Local Governments to Legislate the Contours of Federal Criminal Law, 44 Env’t L. Rep.
10072, 10074 (2014) (arguing that many criminal delegations would fail a heightened
intelligible principle test); A.J. Kritikos, Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A
Compromise and an Experiment, 82 Mo. L. Rev. 441, 477–80 (2017) (arguing that the federal
nondelegation doctrine should follow Florida’s doctrine in criminal cases); Wayne A. Logan,
Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 51, 115
n.367 (2008) (expressing reservations about the delegation in the Adam Walsh Act because
“the policy matters in question have unique normative importance affecting the liberty of
individual citizens, but they also lack the technical complexity that typically justifies
delegation based on agency expertise, not to mention the need for insulation from undue
political influence (such as with environmental regulations)”); Logan Sawyer, Grazing,
Grimaud, and Gifford Pinchot: How the Forest Service Overcame the Classical Nondelegation
Doctrine to Establish Administrative Crimes, 24 J.L. & Pol. 169, 171–99 (2008) (describing
the central role that the nondelegation doctrine played in the emergence of administrative
crimes); Edmund H. Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by
Administrative Agencies, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1943) (arguing that criminal delegations
raise no special concerns and therefore should be permitted); Mark D. Alexander, Note,
Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the Administrative Crime, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 612 (1992)
(arguing that judges ought to review criminal delegations de novo in criminal cases). But none
of this scholarship has addressed specifically how the principles underlying the nondelegation
doctrine apply to criminal laws. For an argument that other administrative law doctrines
should apply differently to criminal law, see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034–50 (2006).
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criminal laws.10 And both parties devoted significant portions of their
briefs to the topic.11 But none of the justices in Gundy grappled with those
issues.
This Article takes up the task of evaluating the issues that the Justices
failed to address. It concludes that Congress’s authority to delegate the
writing of criminal laws should be more circumscribed than its power to
delegate the writing of other laws. It arrives at this conclusion because
criminal laws are generally subject to greater restrictions, because the
reasons against delegation have more force in the context of criminal
laws, and because the standard justifications for delegations to agencies
do not support—or at best only weakly support—delegations in the
criminal context.
Since 1812, the Supreme Court has maintained that the defining of
crimes and fixing of punishments are the sole province of Congress.12 It
also has long required Congress to speak more precisely when enacting
criminal laws, employing the rule of lenity to interpret statutes in favor of
defendants and striking down vague laws for violating the Due Process
Clause.13 The Court has justified the prohibition against vague laws, in
part, as a way to protect individual rights. But it has also said that this
prohibition serves the structural purpose of ensuring that Congress, rather
than the courts or the executive, defines criminal conduct.14 These
foundational principles weigh heavily against permitting broad
delegations of the power to write criminal rules.
Those principles also reveal a deep tension between the nondelegation
doctrine and criminal law doctrines, including the constitutional
prohibition against vague laws. The prevailing justification for
delegations of the power to write rules is that the “law” is the delegating
10
E.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1991); see also Carter v. WellesBowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 734 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (observing that
the Court had not resolved whether a higher standard applies to criminal delegations).
11
See Brief for Petitioner at 17–23, Gundy v. United States, No. 17-6086 (2018), 2018 WL
2441585, at *17–23; Brief for the United States at 44–53, Gundy, No. 17-6086, 2018 WL
3727086, at *44–53.
12
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
13
See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (using the rule of lenity to overturn
a federal firearms conviction); Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914)
(striking down Kentucky antitrust laws as impermissibly vague on due process grounds).
14
See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 279, 284–86 & nn.43–54 (2003) (collecting cases); Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 Ariz. St. L.J. 1137, 1143–45 & nn.31–42 (2016)
(collecting articles).
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statute, not the regulations themselves.15 But if it is the statute that we
must treat as law, rather than the agency’s regulations, then the statute
itself must satisfy the vagueness doctrine. This is significant because
many statutes that delegate criminal rulemaking authority do not satisfy
the vagueness test. They offer virtually no guidance on what is illegal;
instead, they provide only the loosest set of considerations that an agency
must weigh in later declaring what is illegal. Put differently, the statutes
do not specify what is illegal; they say only that an agency will later state
what is illegal. This incompatibility between the prevailing justification
for modern nondelegation doctrine and the vagueness doctrine is a stark
illustration of the fundamental problem with treating criminal delegations
no differently than other delegations.
In short, criminal law delegations are different from other delegations.
They are inconsistent with foundational criminal law doctrine, they
present greater threats to the principles underlying the nondelegation
doctrine, and they are not supported by the ordinary arguments in favor
of delegation. And so we should treat criminal law delegations differently.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the current
nondelegation doctrine and how that doctrine has been applied in cases
involving criminal law. It explains that, while the Supreme Court has
often suggested that criminal law delegations ought to receive stricter
scrutiny under the nondelegation doctrine, it has not actually struck a
delegation down on that ground.
Part II explains why criminal law delegations ought to be viewed
differently than non-criminal law delegations. It begins by identifying the
ways in which the law treats criminal statutes differently from noncriminal statutes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress—
rather than the executive or the judiciary—must make the criminal law,
and it has placed special restrictions on how criminal laws are interpreted
and enforced. Part II then explains that the very same concerns that led to
the creation of these different criminal doctrines—namely, undue threats
to liberty, inadequate government accountability, and insufficient notice
of legal requirements—have been cited by delegation’s critics as a reason
to forbid broad congressional delegations. Because the need to protect
liberty, ensure accountability, and assure notice are heightened for
criminal laws, and because these principles are threatened by broad
15
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); see also Watts, supra
note 2, at 1005 (discussing this theory).
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delegations, the delegation of criminal rulemaking power should be
viewed with deep suspicion.
Part II also demonstrates that the reasons that are traditionally offered
in support of broad delegations—expertise, promoting compromise, and
efficiency—are far less convincing when it comes to the enactment of
criminal laws. Criminal law questions are largely about moral judgment,
which does not turn on technical expertise. And to the extent criminal law
raises empirical questions, answering those questions would need to
account for many competing costs and benefits across many different
areas—requiring a range of expertise that is far broader than what we
ordinarily expect from agency officials. Similarly, the ability to
compromise and the ability to act efficiently are less pressing in criminal
law. Legislators have proven to be far more efficient and cooperative in
passing criminal statutes than legislation in other areas.
Part III places the delegation of promulgating criminal laws in context.
It acknowledges that some may see criminal law delegations as
unexceptional because Congress routinely confers broad discretionary
power on law enforcement. In particular, Congress has enacted broad and
overlapping criminal statutes. Those enactments leave a large amount of
criminal justice policy to prosecutors, who enjoy enormous discretion
over which charges to bring. But the policy discretion resulting from those
broad and overlapping statutes is not equivalent to the policy power
resulting from delegations. The former provides more options to
prosecutors in exercising their executive charging power. The latter
authorizes the executive to decide what is criminal.
Part IV turns from theory to application. It sketches different ways to
implement a stricter nondelegation doctrine for criminal laws that would
be consistent with the principles underlying both criminal law and
administrative law. It explains that courts could vindicate those principles
either by prohibiting all delegations involving criminal law or by adopting
a more robust version of the intelligible principle doctrine for statutes that
impose criminal penalties. It briefly addresses the benefits and drawbacks
of each approach, and it ultimately recommends that, at the least, the
Court should use the vagueness doctrine to police criminal law
delegations.
I. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
To understand what was at stake in Gundy, it is first necessary to
describe the nondelegation doctrine, both in general and as it has been

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

288

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:281

applied in criminal cases. This Part provides that background information
and identifies the uncertainty surrounding criminal law delegations that
existed before Gundy. It then describes Gundy, highlighting how the
Gundy Court failed to address the particular concerns raised by criminal
law delegations.
A. A Brief History of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I provides that “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress.”16 This provision assigns all lawmaking powers to
Congress, and no other constitutional provision authorizes another body
of government to exercise federal legislative power. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly said that Congress cannot delegate this
Article I legislative power to another branch of government.17
At the same time, the Court has recognized that Congress can assign
the task of implementing the law to the executive.18 For two centuries,
however, the Court has noted the difficulty in distinguishing statutes that
permissibly assign the task of implementation from statutes that
impermissibly delegate legislative power.19 As Chief Justice Marshall put

16

U.S. Const. art. I.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“Congress, this
Court explained early on, may not transfer to another branch ‘powers which are strictly and
exclusively legislative.’” (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43
(1825))); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”). Some
have disagreed with this position. They have argued that, although Article I assigns legislative
power to Congress, it does not prohibit Congress from redelegating that authority to others.
See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (arguing
that Congress should be permitted to delegate its legislative power); 1 Kenneth Culp Davis &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, at 66 (3d ed. 1994) (“The Court
probably was mistaken from the outset in interpreting Article I’s grant of power to Congress
as an implicit limit on Congress’ authority to delegate legislative power.”).
18
E.g., Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (“Congress may ‘obtain[] the assistance of its coordinate
Branches’—and in particular, may confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to
implement and enforce the laws.” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989))).
19
Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 46 (“[T]he precise boundary of this power is a subject
of delicate and difficult inquiry . . . .”); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1238 (“The challenge of
locating the line between those actions that Congress must make for itself, and those that can
be properly ascribed to an agency in its execution of law, remains the central difficulty in
implementing the nondelegation principle today.”).
17
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it, “[t]he line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects.”20
Courts have almost always erred on the side of upholding statutes
authorizing others to promulgate rules with the force of law.21 The
Supreme Court has said that delegations to make such rules are
constitutional so long as Congress provides an “intelligible principle” that
guides the exercise of the delegated authority.22 According to the Court,
the inclusion of an intelligible principle ensures that the statute does not
delegate legislative power.23 If a statute includes an intelligible principle,
the argument goes, it merely calls upon executive officials to exercise
their executive authority to adopt policies implementing the law that
Congress wrote through its legislative power.24
Applying that intelligible principle test, the Court has struck down only
two statutes as unlawful delegations.25 Both decisions were issued in
1935. In the first case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court struck
down a provision of the National Recovery Act that authorized the
President to decide whether to prohibit the interstate transportation of
petroleum produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of state-set
quotas.26 The Court reasoned that the statute did not provide an

20

Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 379, 392–405 (2017) (chronicling the Supreme Court’s “track record” of
“deference to congressional decisions to delegate some rulemaking to others”).
22
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (“Congress . . . may confer substantial discretion on executive
agencies to implement and enforce the laws . . . . [Such] a statutory delegation is constitutional
as long as Congress lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person
or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
23
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (“The intelligible-principle rule seeks
to enforce the understanding that Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and so
may delegate no more than the authority to make policies and rules that implement its
statutes.”).
24
Id.; see also id. at 777 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“Legislative power is nondelegable. Congress can no more ‘delegate’ some of its Article I
power to the Executive than it could ‘delegate’ some to one of its committees. What Congress
does is to assign responsibilities to the Executive; and when the Executive undertakes those
assigned responsibilities it acts, not as the ‘delegate’ of Congress, but as the agent of the
People.”).
25
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (“Only twice in this country’s history . . . have we found a
delegation excessive . . . .”).
26
293 U.S. 388, 415, 418, 430 (1935).
21
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intelligible principle guiding the President’s discretion and, therefore,
impermissibly conferred legislative authority.27
In the second case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the
Court struck down another part of the National Recovery Act.28 That part
authorized the President to approve codes of fair competition for
slaughterhouses and other industries. The Court stated that “aside from
the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion,” the statute provided “no standards” for when the President
should approve codes.29 Accordingly, the Court concluded, the statute
impermissibly delegated “legislative power to the President to exercise an
unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or
advisable.”30
Since rendering those decisions, the Court has upheld every statute
delegating rulemaking authority that it has considered.31 It has found
adequately intelligible principles in statutes with only the vaguest of
guidance, such as statutes authorizing agencies to make rules that are in
the “public interest” or that are “just and reasonable.”32 They have even
been willing to supply intelligible principles for statutes that otherwise do
not contain such principles in their statutory text.33 Lower federal courts
have followed a similar course, almost uniformly rejecting all
nondelegation challenges.34
27
Id. at 430 (stating that the Act “ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] established no standard,
ha[d] laid down no rule”).
28
295 U.S. 495, 521–22 (1935).
29
Id. at 541.
30
Id. at 537–38.
31
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019).
32
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat’l Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944); Nat’l Broad. Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (stating that courts should not “second-guess” the degree of
discretion afforded in delegations by Congress).
33
See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (reading into a statute authorizing the Secretary of Labor to regulate toxic
substances a requirement that the Secretary find a significant risk of harm from the toxin); see
also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (“In recent years, our application
of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory
texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might
otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”).
34
Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93
Notre Dame L. Rev. 619, 636 (2017) (noting only one successful federal nondelegation
challenge that was not reversed on appeal). State courts have been more receptive to
nondelegation challenges based on their own state constitutions. See id. (reporting a 16%
success rate in state nondelegation challenges).
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Although courts continue to apply the intelligible principle test, the
nondelegation doctrine has faced significant criticism on many different
fronts. One common criticism is that the doctrine is an empty formality,
as evidenced by the near-uniform unwillingness to strike down statutes as
improper delegations.35
Another criticism is that the intelligible principle test is inconsistent
with the original meaning of the Constitution. This criticism comes from
both sides. Some argue that the test permits delegations that are forbidden
under the original understanding of the Constitution.36 Others criticize the
test as too narrow, arguing that the Founders meant to permit all
delegations instead of only those supported by an intelligible principle.37
A third criticism of the intelligible principle doctrine is that it is simply
not true that an agency exercises executive instead of legislative power
when it promulgates a legislative rule.38 This criticism rests on the idea
that legislative rules do not simply give effect to binding norms enacted
by Congress. Instead, the legislative rules themselves establish binding
norms. They declare what is legal or illegal. Conduct that is otherwise
lawful becomes unlawful if it violates a legislative rule.39 That the rule
35
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1241 (calling the test “limp”); Watts, supra note 2, at 1006
(calling the test “toothless”); see also Lawson, supra note 2, at 328–29 (“[T]he
Court . . . has steadfastly found intelligible principles where less discerning readers find
gibberish.”).
36
See, e.g., Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘intelligible
principle’ [test] has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution, in history, or even in
the decision from which it was plucked.”).
37
See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3512154 [https://perma.cc/5TP9-L66Y] (presenting historical
evidence in support of the idea that Article I prevents Congress only from alienating its
legislative power, not from delegating it); Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 21, at 381 (using
a dataset of more than two thousand cases to support the claim that the nondelegation doctrine
is a myth because “there was never a time in which the courts used the nondelegation doctrine
to limit legislative delegations of power”).
38
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we have
actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative
power.’”); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 1035, 1044 (2007) (arguing that the position that an intelligible principle makes
rulemaking executive instead of legislative “leads to quite odd and untenable conclusions”);
Watts, supra note 2, at 1013 (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine’s central premise prohibiting
the delegation of legislative power has little connection to the real world.”).
39
See, e.g., Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[L]egislative rules are those
that ‘create new law, rights, or duties, in what amounts to a legislative act.’” (quoting White
v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir.1993))); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561,
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may be promulgated pursuant to a statute that includes an intelligible
principle changes nothing. The rule that the agency promulgates under
that statute still makes a binding norm that establishes what is legal or
illegal. The intelligible principle simply provides the agency with
guidance on how to make the law.40
B. Criminal Delegations
The story of criminal delegations is more complicated. On the one
hand, the Court has upheld many statutes delegating the power to
promulgate rules whose violation constitutes a crime. As long ago as the
1897 decision in In re Kollock, the Court concluded that the Constitution
does not prohibit Congress from assigning to an agency the power to
prescribe elements of a criminal offense. Kollock involved a statute
making it a crime to sell margarine unless it had been “marked and
branded as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . shall prescribe.”41
Kollock, who had been convicted for selling margarine not marked as
required by IRS rules, argued that the statute unlawfully delegated
legislative power “to determine what acts shall be criminal” to the IRS.42
The Court rejected the challenge. It stated that the statute itself required
packages to be “marked and branded,” and the regulations “simply
described the particular marks, stamps and brands to be used.”43 Thus, the
Court concluded, “[t]he criminal offence is fully and completely defined
by the act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular
marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail.”44
On the other hand, decisions rendered since Kollock have suggested
that there may be greater limits on Congress’s authority to delegate in the
context of criminal law. One example comes from the 1911 decision in

1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“[I]f by its action the agency intends to create new law, rights
or duties, the rule is properly considered to be a legislative rule.”); see also Reynolds v. United
States, 565 U.S. 432, 440 (2012) (stating that, through his determination, the Attorney General
could create new legal obligations).
40
See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 38, at 1044 (making a similar argument by noting
that the Constitution itself provides intelligible principles cabining Congress’s power).
41
In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 528 (1897); Act of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209, 209–
13 (defining butter, also imposing a tax upon and regulating the manufacture, sale,
importation, and exportation of oleomargarine).
42
Kollock, 165 U.S. at 533.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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United States v. Grimaud.45 There, the Court upheld a statute making it a
crime to violate regulations aimed at protecting forest reserves. But in
doing so, the Court distinguished statutes authorizing an agency to decide
whether to criminalize a legal violation or to “fix[] the punishment” for a
crime. Those types of statutes, the Court said, would entail the exercise
of “the legislative power.”46
Thirty-five years later, the Court again suggested a limitation on
criminal delegations in Fahey v. Mallonee.47 In the course of upholding a
statute authorizing the promulgation of non-criminal rules regulating
savings and loan associations, the Court distinguished Panama and
Schechter—the two 1935 cases striking down statutes as unlawful
delegations—on the ground that violating the agency regulations in those
cases constituted a crime. Although the opinions in neither Panama nor
Schechter relied on the criminal penalties in striking down the
delegations, the Fahey Court said that one reason it struck down the
delegations in Panama and Schechter was that they delegated the “power
to make federal crimes.”48 The Court repeated this sentiment more
recently in Mistretta v. United States,49 suggesting that special concerns
apply to delegations that “make crimes of acts never before
criminalized.”50
Despite their suggestions that criminal delegations should be treated
differently, the Court has not provided any consistent guidance about how
to evaluate delegations of criminal power. Some cases, such as Fahey,
Grimaud, and Mistretta, suggest that statutes authorizing agencies to
promulgate at least some types of criminal rules are always
unconstitutional delegations. But other cases suggest a different approach.
In Touby v. United States,51 for example, the Supreme Court suggested
that such statutes are not automatically unconstitutional, but instead, they
must satisfy only a more rigorous intelligible principle standard.52 Touby

45

220 U.S. 506 (1911).
Id. at 523.
47
332 U.S. 245 (1947).
48
Id. at 249.
49
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
50
Id. at 373 n.7. This was not the only ground of distinction. The Court also concluded that,
unlike the statutes at issue in Panama and Schechter, the Sentencing Reform Act “set[] forth
more than merely an ‘intelligible principle’ or minimal standards.” Id. at 379.
51
500 U.S. 160 (1991).
52
Id. at 165–66.
46
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involved a challenge to the Controlled Substances Act,53 which gives the
Attorney General significant authority over which drugs appear on the
“schedules” of controlled substances.54 Once a drug is added to a
schedule, its manufacture, distribution, and possession is either regulated
or prohibited. An individual who violates those regulations and
prohibitions is subject to severe criminal penalties. In upholding the
statute, the Supreme Court stated that it “need not resolve” whether
Congress must provide “more specific guidance.”55 Resolution was not
necessary, according to the Touby Court, because even if a higher
standard did apply, the statute satisfied it.56
Even in cases where the Court has suggested that criminal law
delegations are different, those statements appear to be little more than lip
service. Take, for example, the opinion in United States v. Grimaud.57 The
Grimaud Court rejected a nondelegation challenge to a statute that
imposed criminal penalties for violating regulations regarding the use of
public forest lands. Those regulations had been promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture. The defendants had been convicted for grazing
sheep without a permit. The opinion concluded by stating that the
Secretary “did not exercise the legislative power of declaring the penalty
or fixing the punishment for grazing sheep without a permit, but the
punishment is imposed by the act itself.”58 Yet the statute delegating
regulatory power made no reference to grazing, to sheep, or to permits.59
It is difficult to understand how a statute could impose a punishment for
an act that it never mentions. The statute did set a punishment: “a fine of
not more than five hundred dollars and imprisonment for not more than

53
Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 801 et seq.).
54
21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
55
Touby, 500 U.S. at 166.
56
Id. at 165–66.
57
220 U.S. 506 (1911).
58
Id. at 523.
59
The Court acknowledged as much, stating that it was “true that there is no act of Congress
which, in express terms, declares that it shall be unlawful to graze sheep on a forest reserve,”
id. at 521, and then took pains to argue that the statute ought to be read against a backdrop of
a previous case. That case had discussed “the implied license under which the United States
had suffered its public domain to be used as a pasture for sheep and cattle,” and it had inferred
from other sections of the statute that the Secretary was authorized to create a permitting
process to generate revenue. Id.; see also Sawyer, supra note 9, at 181 (noting that the relevant
Act made no mention of grazing and that the decision to omit any reference to grazing was
deliberate because it was such a controversial topic).
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twelve months or both.”60 But it was left entirely to the Secretary to decide
what conduct on public forest lands warranted that punishment.61
Moreover, Grimaud’s statement that the nondelegation doctrine
requires Congress, rather than an executive official, to “fix[] the
punishment,” is nearly impossible to square with the decision in
Mistretta.62 At issue in Mistretta was the Sentencing Reform Act, which
delegated to the Sentencing Commission the task of setting mandatory
sentencing ranges for all federal crimes.63 Despite Grimaud’s restriction
on fixing punishment, the Mistretta Court rejected a nondelegation
challenge to the Sentencing Reform Act. It explained that the delegation
posed no constitutional problem because it did not involve writing
regulations that “bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public.”64 In
other words, even though the precise power that Congress had delegated
was the “power of declaring the penalty or fixing the punishment”—a
power that Grimaud tells us is a “legislative power”—the delegation was
deemed permissible, in part because the delegated power did not include
the power to say what conduct was prohibited.
In short, the Court’s decisions on criminal delegations are confused and
conflicting. They disagree on whether a stricter doctrine should apply to
delegations involving criminal laws, and they disagree about which laws
might be subject to this stricter doctrine.
C. Gundy’s Failure
Gundy v. United States presented an opportunity to clarify whether
criminal law delegations ought to be treated differently. At issue in Gundy
was the lawfulness of a provision in SORNA, which authorized the
Attorney General to prescribe registration requirements for individuals
60

Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 509.
The statute told the Secretary only “to regulate the[] occupancy and use” of the lands in a
manner that “protect[s] against destruction by fire and depredations.” Id. at 509 (citing Act of
June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 20 Stat. 35). It “left the definition of every element of the crime to the
discretion of the Secretary.” Sawyer, supra note 9, at 184. Professor Bamzai has defended
Grimaud based on the right/privileges distinction, arguing that the Court upheld the authority
of the agency to criminalize only the violation of the privilege of using public land. Bamzai,
supra note 1, at 180–81. But as Professor Bamzai notes, subsequent decisions, such as Gundy,
cannot be justified on that ground because they do not involve violations of privileges. Id. at
178 n.82.
62
Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 523; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
63
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 tit. II § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987,
1987–90.
64
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396.
61
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convicted of sex offenses before 2006. SORNA makes it a crime to violate
those registration requirements. Gundy, who was convicted for failing to
register as required by the Attorney General’s rules, challenged his
conviction on the ground that SORNA constituted an unconstitutional
delegation.
Gundy squarely presented the issue whether a heightened standard
applies to criminal delegations. One of Gundy’s arguments was that the
Constitution imposes a “special prohibition on congressional delegation
of criminal lawmaking power”65 and therefore a more rigorous standard
should apply to regulations carrying criminal penalties.66 The government
also addressed the issue, arguing that the Court has never adopted a
heightened nondelegation standard for statutes authorizing rules carrying
criminal penalties.67
The parties devoted significant attention to which types of statutes
might trigger a stricter nondelegation test. For example, in defending the
constitutionality of SORNA’s delegation, the government argued that
there is a meaningful distinction between Congress delegating to the
executive the ability to create new crimes in the first instance and
Congress saying that it is creating a new crime and then leaving it to the
executive to decide what conduct will constitute that crime. According to
the government, the former situation would raise substantial
constitutional questions because it would authorize the executive to
“create new federal crimes out of whole cloth,” but the latter was plainly
constitutional because it merely authorizes the executive to “make
determinations that . . . affect criminal liability” under an offense defined
by Congress.68
Whether a heightened standard ought to apply to criminal delegations
was also discussed at length during the oral argument. Counsel for Gundy
argued for a heightened standard in the face of skeptical questioning by
Justice Kagan.69 And multiple Justices asked counsel for the government
65
Brief for Petitioner at 20, Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17-6086);
see also id. at 17 (“The Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers,
particularly in the criminal context.”).
66
Id. at 19 (“Because of its focus on protecting individual liberty, the nondelegation doctrine
is enforced most rigorously in the criminal context.”).
67
Brief for the United States at 44–53, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086).
68
Id. at 44, 47–48.
69
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–29, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086). Justice
Kagan appeared especially concerned by the fact that many ostensibly civil regulations are
enforced through criminal penalties. See id. at 29 (“The point I was making is that all of these
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about the criminal nature of the regulations and whether delegations to
prosecutors ought to be treated differently.70
Although both the written and oral arguments devoted a significant
amount of time and space to these issues, none of the justices addressed
them in their written opinions. Without addressing the arguments that a
different test should apply to criminal delegations, Justice Kagan’s
plurality opinion applied the ordinary intelligible principle test and
concluded that SORNA “easily passes constitutional muster.”71 Indeed,
the plurality used the fact that it was applying the same test to criminal
delegations to justify maintaining the toothless intelligible principle test.
It reasoned that “if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of
Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the need
to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.”72
Nor did Justice Gorsuch discuss in his dissent whether a criminal law
delegation should be subject to a heightened nondelegation test.73 Instead,
he argued in favor of curtailing all delegations. To be sure, some portions
of the dissent sounded in criminal law. For example, he talked about the
need to limit delegations in order to protect liberty,74 and he made
reference to the fact that the case at bar involved the power of the Attorney
General “to write his own criminal code.”75 But Justice Gorsuch made
those points to argue against delegations generally, not to make a special

are civil regulations. The delegation is to say you write the—we’re going to give you some
degree of discretion to write the civil regulation, understanding that if somebody violates that,
that person is going to jail.”).
70
Id. at 42–47, 49–54.
71
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121.
72
Id. at 2130.
73
The dissent did not even mention the criminal character of some past cases. See id. at
2136–37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing Kollock and Grimaud as acceptable delegations
without mentioning their criminal character). But cf. id. at 2138 (noting that Schechter
involved “a criminal indictment running to dozens of counts”).
74
Id. at 2131 (“The Constitution promises that only the people's elected representatives may
adopt new federal laws restricting liberty.”); id. (“[I]f a single executive branch official can
write laws restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does that mean for the next?”);
id. at 2134 (“Why did the framers insist on this particular arrangement? They believed the new
federal government's most dangerous power was the power to enact laws restricting the
people's liberty.”); id. (“Some occasionally complain about Article I’s detailed and arduous
processes for new legislation, but to the framers these were bulwarks of liberty.”); id. at 2145
(“Respecting the separation of powers forecloses no substantive outcomes. It only requires us
to respect along the way one of the most vital of the procedural protections of individual liberty
found in our Constitution.”).
75
See id. at 2148.
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case against criminal delegations.76 He did not distinguish between
government limitations on liberty that could result in criminal punishment
and those that merely regulated private conduct.77
The failure to address whether a different standard should apply to
criminal delegations is unfortunate. Because Gundy did not produce a
majority opinion, it did nothing to clarify the status of criminal
delegations. It is all the more unfortunate because of the importance of
the issue. Many federal statutes authorize federal agencies to establish
regulations, the violation of which constitutes a crime.78 Some statutes
make it a crime simply to violate regulations promulgated by agencies.
For example, under 54 U.S.C. § 100751, it is a crime to violate National
Park Service rules relating to protecting federal lands and waters.79 These
statutes do not dictate the particular conduct that is illegal. Instead, they
leave to agencies the task of dictating what is illegal.
Other statutes leave the definition of one or more elements of a crime
to an administrative agency. For example, federal law provides that a
person who deals in explosives without a license faces up to 10 years of
imprisonment,80 and the law delegates to the Attorney General the

76

Id. at 2136–41.
See, e.g., id. at 2133 (“When it came to the legislative power, the framers understood it
to mean the power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by
private persons—the power to ‘prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated,’ or the power to ‘prescribe general rules for the government of
society.’” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 2136 (“[W]e know that as long as Congress makes the
policy decisions when regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to ‘fill up
the details.’”); id. (“[O]nce Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may
make the application of that rule depend on executive fact-finding.”).
78
Some statutes authorize agencies to promulgate regulations to create exceptions to
otherwise applicable criminal laws. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 504(1)(D)(iii), the
Secretary of the Treasury can promulgate regulations authorizing color illustrations of
currency that would otherwise constitute unlawful counterfeiting. These types of delegations
do not authorize promulgation of criminal prohibitions.
79
54 U.S.C. § 100751(c). For other examples of statutes making it a crime to violate rules
promulgated by agencies, see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(5) (imposing a penalty of “imprisonment
for not more than 10 years” for willful violations of “any rule or regulation” promulgated by
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission); 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (making it a crime to
violate regulations related to protecting marine mammals); 21 U.S.C. § 331(q)(1)(A) (making
it a crime for failing to comply with various regulations related to drugs, medical devices, and
labeling); 33 U.S.C. § 1907 (making it a crime to violate EPA regulations implementing the
Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships).
80
18 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1).
77
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authority to determine what constitutes an explosive.81 This statutory
scheme does not make it a crime simply to violate regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General. But in leaving to the Attorney
General the task of defining explosives, it allows him to define an element
of the crime.
II. REASONS TO TREAT CRIMINAL LAW DIFFERENTLY
In evaluating a delegation of power to write criminal laws, the justices
in Gundy applied the ordinary intelligible principle doctrine. But this onesize-fits-all approach is unwarranted. The law imposes a number of
special restrictions relating to criminal law.82 These restrictions affect
who can create the law, the permissible substance of the law, and the ways
in which the law is interpreted and enforced. Similarly, special restrictions
should apply to delegations of authority to promulgate criminal rules.83
A more rigorous nondelegation doctrine should apply to criminal law
because delegations raise the very concerns that underlie those heightened
restrictions on criminal law. Broad congressional delegations risk
unwarranted deprivations of liberty, undermine government
accountability, and result in less notice to the public of legal obligations.
Because those same concerns led to the adoption of heightened
restrictions for criminal law, they also counsel against permitting criminal
law delegations. Additionally, the reasons that are ordinarily offered in
support of broad legislative delegations in other areas—namely,
expertise, promoting compromise, and ensuring efficiency—apply with
less force when it comes to the criminal law.

81

Id. § 841(d) (“The Attorney General shall publish and revise at least annually in the
Federal Register a list of these and any additional explosives which he determines to be within
the coverage of this chapter.”); see also 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (criminalizing the knowing
importing or exporting wildlife in violation of any regulation promulgated by any agency); 18
U.S.C. § 42 (making it a crime to import animals prohibited by the Secretary of the Interior);
id. § 1716C (criminalizing forgery of certificates authorized by the Postal Service); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d) (making it a crime to knowingly transport, create, or dispose of hazardous waste in
violation of EPA regulations).
82
See Barkow, supra note 9, at 1012 (discussing “criminal law exceptionalism”).
83
See Fissell, supra note 9, at 880 (noting “the immediate intuitive objection to treating
criminal law delegations in the same way that other agency regulations are treated”).
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A. The Special Status of Criminal Laws
It is conventional wisdom among criminal law scholars that criminal
punishment is unique.84 Because punishment is a moral judgment,
punishment may be imposed only when someone has engaged in behavior
that is worthy of moral condemnation.85 This need for community
condemnation has led criminal theorists to conclude that only laws which
were enacted by a democratically accountable body may form the basis
of criminal punishment.86
But we need not reach first principles about the legitimacy of
punishment in order to make the case that criminal laws are different. The
text of the Constitution and various legal doctrines demonstrate that our
legal system regularly treats criminal laws differently from other laws.
These doctrines not only place substantive limits on criminal law and
provide procedural guarantees in criminal trials, but they also aim to
ensure congressional control over the content of criminal law and require
Congress to take special care in the drafting of criminal statutes.
Much could be said about each of these constitutional and doctrinal
limits on criminal law, and our treatment of each is necessarily brief. But
even our brief overview highlights that these limits rest, at least in part,
on three key principles. First, many of these limits are designed to protect
against unjustified deprivations of liberty. Second, the limits help to
promote accountability of government actors. And third, the limits strive
to ensure that individuals have notice about the legality and consequences
of their actions.

84
See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, An Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration, 60 B.C. L. Rev.
1949, 1953–54 (2019) (collecting and categorizing different claims of criminal law
“exceptionalism”); Note, supra note 9, at 614 (“Crimes have always represented a special case,
constitutionally and philosophically.”).
85
See, e.g., W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship,
Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 117, 136–60 (2011) (arguing
that the additional stigma associated with criminal laws require more due process protection);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & Contemp. Probs. 401, 404 (1958)
(“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured,
is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition.”); Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C.
L. Rev. 1849, 1855 (2011) (“Under the traditional view, criminal law is supposed to reflect
and channel society’s moral impulses, and criminal law necessarily contains an element of
social condemnation.”).
86
E.g., Fissell, supra note 9, at 885–900; Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of
Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1455, 1553–54 (2016).
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The Constitution contains many provisions applicable only to those
facing criminal punishment.87 Some of those protections—such as the
prohibitions on ex post facto laws and bills of attainder,88 and the
provision defining treason89—place limits on the substance of criminal
laws. Others prescribe procedures that the government must follow in
criminal cases. Examples include the grand jury and petit jury
requirements, the right to the assistance of counsel, the speedy trial
guarantee, prohibition on double jeopardy, and the heightened burdens of
proof imposed through the Due Process Clauses.90 These constitutional
provisions help to protect liberty, either by preventing the government
from enacting certain laws or by ensuring that defendants enjoy
procedural protections before they can be convicted and punished. In
addition, the prohibition on ex post facto laws ensures that people will
have notice about the legality and consequences of their actions, because
it prevents the government from retroactively stating that conduct was
forbidden or is subject to heightened penalties.91
Courts have also interpreted the Constitution to impose additional
constraints on the drafting and enactment of criminal laws. In justifying
those constraints, the courts have variously invoked the need to protect
liberty, promote accountability, and ensure notice.
Most important for purposes of this Article, courts have read the
Constitution to impose different structural requirements on criminal laws
than on non-criminal laws. Since 1812, the Supreme Court has held that
federal courts lack the power to create criminal common law.92 United
87
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 351, 382–83 (2019) (cataloguing these provisions).
88
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
89
Id. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”).
90
Id. amends. V, VI.
91
See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1981) (“Through this prohibition [on ex post
facto laws], the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect
and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.”); Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause is based on “the notion
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal
penalties”).
92
See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). This was not
always the view in the United States. At the Founding, federal judges were widely understood
to have the power to create common law crimes. See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part One, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003 (1985) (providing historical evidence). But when
common law crimes became powerful weapons in the battles between the Federalists and the
Republicans, judicial authority to convict in the absence of a statute fell into disfavor. Id. at
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States v. Wiltberger, an early nineteenth century case, is instructive.
There, the Supreme Court noted that “the plain principle that the power
of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.
It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain
its punishment.”93 The Court has reaffirmed that principle many times in
the intervening decades.94 As Justice Owen Roberts put it: “It cannot be
too often emphasized that as basic a difference as any between our notions
of law and those of legal systems not founded on Anglo-American
conceptions of liberty is that crimes must be defined by the legislature.”95
There is no comparable restriction on non-criminal common law. Even
after Erie, federal courts have continued to recognize their authority to
fashion federal civil common law.96

1112. And when Republicans gained control of the Supreme Court in 1812, they declared that
federal courts had no criminal common law authority in Hudson & Goodwin. Despite this
early history, legislative supremacy over criminal law is a bedrock principle of current
American legal thought. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)
(“[L]egislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”); see also Rogers v.
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 476 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating “the notion of a commonlaw crime is utterly anathema today”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law
Crimes, 105 Va. L. Rev. 965, 971–78 (2019) (documenting the conventional wisdom of
legislative supremacy).
93
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); see also Sawyer, supra note 9, at 185–86 (describing
the understanding of “classical jurists” that “Hudson & Goodwin appear[s] to assign the
authority to define criminal activity exclusively to Congress”).
94
See, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (noting that “the substantive power
to define crimes and prescribe punishments” lies with the “legislative branch of government”);
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a
criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which
are solely creatures of statute.”); Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (“[L]egislatures and not courts should
define criminal activity.”).
95
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 152 (1945) (Roberts, Frankfurter, & Jackson, JJ.,
dissenting). Although the federal government has long eschewed common law crimes, many
states have not. As of 1947, more than thirty states still permitted judicial crime creation, and
at present, more than a dozen states continue to do so. See Hessick, supra note 92, at 980–81.
This suggests that the federal prohibition on common law crimes may be grounded in
federalism or some other particular feature of the federal Constitution, rather than in due
process.
96
See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 409 (1964) (discussing the development of civil common law after Erie);
see also, e.g., Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 n.9 (2003) (“Federal common law governs
interstate bodies of water . . . .”); Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 365–66
(1943) (creating federal common law for the “rights and duties of the United States on
commercial paper”). See generally Arthur D. Hellman, David B. Stras, Ryan W. Scoot & F.
Andrew Hessick, Federal Courts 379–469 (4th ed. 2017) (canvassing the authority of federal
courts to make common law).
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Another constitutional limitation that applies to criminal laws is the
void for vagueness doctrine.97 The vagueness doctrine requires that a
criminal statute “clearly define the conduct it proscribes.”98 A statute that
does not do so violates due process.99 The Supreme Court has offered
three reasons why a vague criminal statute violates the right to due
process.100 First, vague laws give insufficient notice to citizens about what
conduct is permitted and what conduct is prohibited.101 Second, vague
statutes provide “insufficient standards for enforcement.”102 When a
statute fails to give police and prosecutors a clear indication of what
conduct is legal, the statute “vests virtually complete discretion in the
hands” of law enforcement.103 According to the Court, such unfettered
discretion may result in “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”104
because it “allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections.”105 Third, vague statutes delegate too much of the
legislature’s power to make the law.106
97
The Court has struck down three federal statutes on vagueness grounds in the past five
years. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204
(2018); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
98
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
99
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1224–26
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (tracing the vagueness
doctrine’s “due process underpinnings”).
100
See Hessick, supra note 14, at 1140–45; see also Goldsmith, supra note 14, at 283–94
(identifying three major reasons for the vagueness doctrine, and two others offered by Justice
Frankfurter and Anthony Amsterdam).
101
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (“The doctrine incorporates notions of fair
notice or warning.”).
102
Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982).
103
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); see also Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578
(remarking on the “the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and
triers of fact” under a vague statute).
104
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573.
105
Id. at 575.
106
E.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 91–92 (1921); United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875); see also Goldsmith, supra note 14, at 284–86 (collecting
cases on the delegation issue and noting that the principle “that the separation of powers must
be maintained[] stood for decades as the second requirement of vagueness analysis”); Fifth
Amendment—Due Process—Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine—Sessions v. Dimaya, 132 Harv.
L. Rev. 367, 372 (2018) (stating that the vagueness doctrine requires notice and increases
legislative accountability). While the Court has mentioned notice and arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement in all of its modern vagueness opinions, the delegation issue
appears in only some of those opinions. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court’s precedents have occasionally described the
vagueness doctrine in terms of nondelegation . . . . But they have not been consistent on this

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

304

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:281

Judges have also developed different sub-constitutional doctrines for
criminal laws. For example, they have been more aggressive when
interpreting criminal laws, requiring greater specificity from the
legislature than they do when interpreting non-criminal laws. Up until the
early twentieth century, courts often responded with skepticism, if not
with hostility, to the enactment of criminal statutes, insisting that such
statutes must be “strictly construed.”107 While strict construction has
fallen out of favor,108 judges have continued to maintain a more active
front.”); Hessick, supra note 14, at 1143 (“While these two concerns [notice and arbitrary
enforcement] are offered in all of the recent vagueness cases, in a small handful of cases, the
Court also mentioned that vague laws raise delegation problems.”).
107
E.g., Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187, 197 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that
penal statutes must be strictly construed . . . .”); Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 576
(1894) (“That is a penal statute, and must receive a strict construction.”); Reese, 92 U.S. at
219 (“This is a penal statute, and must be construed strictly . . . .”); United States v. Johnson,
26 F. Cas. 621, 623 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1879) (No. 15,483) (noting “the rule that penal statutes
shall be strictly construed”); Bray v. The Atalanta, 4 F. Cas. 37, 38 (C.C.D. S.C. 1794) (No.
1,819) (“[I]t is a penal law and must be construed strictly.”). The canon of strict construction
evolved in response to harsh laws and penal practices in England, Livingston Hall, Strict or
Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 749–51 (1935), and it was
imported with other important common law principles into early American law via the
treatises of the time. See, e.g., 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *87–92. American courts
routinely repeated and applied the rule of strict construction of penal statutes for more than a
century. Hall, supra, at 748 (“Undoubtedly precedent—the hundreds of cases stating and
usually applying the common-law rule of strict construction of penal statutes—is one of the
most powerful forces shaping the attitude of the courts today towards this problem.”); Roscoe
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 386 (1908) (“We are told
commonly that three classes of statutes are to be construed strictly: penal statutes; statutes in
derogation of common right; and statutes in derogation of the common law.”).
108
Strict construction came under attack in the beginning of the twentieth century for
essentially the same reasons that judicial resistance to New Deal legislation faced criticism.
As Livingston Hall argued in 1935:
Changing conditions of modern civilization, and the growth of scientific knowledge on
criminology, render imperative a new approach to the problems of crime. New
categories of crimes and criminals cannot always be accurately defined on the first
attempt. Shall the new machinery be nullified from the start under the guise of “strict
construction”, or shall it be carried out liberally in the spirit in which it is conceived?
Merely to state the issue is to answer it.
Hall, supra note 107, at 761. Mila Sohoni has explained that, as the courts stopped pushing
back against social welfare legislation, they also abandoned many of the criminal law
doctrines that had previously served as a limit on legislatures’ ability to criminalize behavior.
Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 Duke L.J. 1169 (2013). Not only have courts
generally replaced the rule of strict construction with the less robust rule of lenity, Amy Coney
Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 128–34 (2010), but
they have also watered down the rule of lenity, using it only as a tool of last resort, see Dan
M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 385–86 (1994);
Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity, Ambiguity and Corpus Linguistics,
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interpretive role in criminal cases. The rule of lenity is perhaps the most
well-known example of this phenomenon. The rule of lenity requires
judges to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants.109
It is one of the oldest rules of statutory interpretation.110 Although courts
enforce the rule less rigorously today than they did in the past, it continues
to play a role in criminal cases.111 The Supreme Court has offered two
justifications for the rule of lenity. The first is that interpreting ambiguous
statutes narrowly is better for giving people fair notice of what behavior
is criminal.112 The second justification is that it protects against the “the
instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker
has clearly said they should.”113 This second reason is grounded in the
separation of powers.114 Indeed, the Court has specifically referenced the
need for legislatures, rather than courts, to define criminal activity when
justifying the rule of lenity.115
In sum, our legal system regularly treats criminal laws differently from
other laws. Although the courts have been less aggressive in policing the
legislative drafting of criminal laws since the New Deal, they continue to
impose more stringent restrictions on criminal laws than on non-criminal
laws. And the courts routinely reference the need to protect liberty,
promote accountability, and ensure notice when adopting and justifying
those restrictions.

25 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 101, 106–20 (2016) (tracing the decreasing force of lenity in court
opinions); Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885,
891 (2004) (noting that prevailing doctrine “ranks lenity dead last in the interpretive
hierarchy”).
109
See Black’s Law Dictionary 1532 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “rule of lenity” as “[t]he
judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient
punishment”).
110
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); Barrett, supra note 108,
at 128; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 57,
87–96 (1998) (recounting lenity’s history in England and the early United States).
111
See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019) (invoking rule of lenity to
support interpretation).
112
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
113
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting H. Friendly, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks 196, 209 (1967)).
114
See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952 (stating that the rule of lenity functions “to maintain the
proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts”); Price, supra note 108, at 909.
115
Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because
criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community,
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”).
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B. Nondelegation and Criminal Principles
Congressional delegations of the power to fashion criminal laws raise
the same three concerns that underpin the criminal-law doctrines
discussed above.116 First, delegations increase the risk of unwarranted
deprivations of liberty. Second, delegations undermine the accountability
structures established by the Constitution. Third, delegations result in less
notice. To the extent these reasons counsel against broad congressional
delegations, they are even more compelling in the context of criminal
delegations.
1. Liberty
Critics of delegations have repeatedly stated that delegations threaten
individual liberty because delegations concentrate power in a single
branch of government.117 The Founders were all too cognizant of the fact
that the government might abuse its power and unjustifiably deprive
individuals of liberty.118 The Constitution protects against this threat, not
only by explicitly protecting certain individual rights, but also by
assigning the legislative, executive, and judicial power to different
governmental institutions.119 As James Madison explained in Federalist
47, the Constitution divides power among the branches of government
because the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and

116

See supra text accompanying notes 93–115.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (warning
that delegations imperil liberty); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The principle that Congress cannot delegate away its
vested powers exists to protect liberty.”); Lawson, supra note 2, at 342 (noting the threat to
liberty from combining government powers through delegation); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
As Law, 107 Geo. L.J. 1613, 1617 (2019) (recounting scholarship arguing that “modern
agencies endanger both liberty and self-government”); see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael
W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1734–35 (2012)
(arguing that separation of powers protects individual liberty).
118
The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (warning of
the “danger[] to liberty” posed by the government); Aaron R. Sims, Note, SIGTARP and the
Executive-Legislative Clash: Confronting A Bowsher Issue with an Eye Toward Preserving
the Separation of Powers During Future Crisis Legislation, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 375, 440–
42 (2011) (discussing the Framers’ apprehension of government power).
119
Sims, supra note 118, at 442 (“The separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances comprise the governmental structure implemented by the Framers for the purpose of
counteracting the human tendency to abuse power such that individual liberty could be
preserved.”).
117
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judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.”120
Delegation undermines this division of power by authorizing executive
bodies to exercise both executive and legislative power. The Framers
regarded this combination as incompatible with the right against
unwarranted deprivations of liberty.121 As Madison put it, “[t]here can be
no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person . . . lest the same monarch . . . should enact tyrannical laws
to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”122
The threat from combining legislative and executive powers is more
pronounced in criminal cases than in civil cases for two reasons. The first
reason is that criminal laws are the primary means by which the
government deprives individuals of liberty.123 Convictions regularly carry
terms of imprisonment or even death, and they regularly impose other
restrictions on offenders’ freedom to act.124 Moreover, the threat of
punishment limits liberty because it prohibits people from engaging in
certain conduct. Each time that the state prohibits additional conduct, it
curtails the freedom of individuals.
The second reason why the threat to liberty is greater for criminal than
civil laws is that the executive has the exclusive power to enforce criminal
laws in the federal system.125 That is not the case with civil laws. The
executive does not have the general power to bring suit to vindicate civil
120

The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“[W]e have not yet found a better way to preserve
freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled
out in the Constitution.”).
121
Nicholas Bagley and Julian Mortenson have documented that early American
legislatures, including the First Congress delegated power on several occasions. Mortenson &
Bagley, supra note 37, at 64–109. This may suggest that even those who are cognizant of the
risks of delegation nonetheless find that the expediency and benefit of delegation are worth
those risks. See infra Section II.C (discussing the reasons in favor of delegation).
122
See The Federalist No. 47, at 302–03 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted); Rebecca L. Brown, Caging the Wolf: Seeking a Constitutional Home for
the Independent Counsel, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1269, 1274 (1999) (“The combination of
legislative power with enforcement power constitutes a very grave affront to the separation of
powers . . . .”).
123
See Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism, supra note 9, at 115 n.367 (noting that, in the
context of criminal delegations, “the policy matters in question have unique normative
importance affecting the liberty of individual citizens”).
124
See Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 Geo. L.J. 1197, 1199 (2016)
(describing collateral consequences of conviction).
125
See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks
a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).
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rights; the individuals whose rights were violated can bring those suits.126
The executive can bring a civil enforcement action only when the
government’s civil rights are violated.127
In addition to these general concerns about combining the legislative
and executive powers, there are several reasons to be particularly
apprehensive of delegations of the power to write criminal laws. The first
is that, when the same institution both writes and enforces the law, it is
much easier for the government to punish individuals. One reason for
dividing power between the executive and legislature is to make it more
difficult to punish individuals under criminal laws.128 Although Congress
can dictate what is illegal through legislation, Congress cannot enforce
the law. Instead, the executive has the authority to decide whether to bring
prosecutions. Because the executive has different sets of priorities and
interests than legislators, it may choose not to enforce the law in the way
intended by Congress.129 Similarly, the executive cannot bring charges
unless Congress first passes legislation. Because it is a separate body with
different interests from the executive, the legislature will not enact laws
aimed solely at achieving the executive’s agenda. Only when the priorities
of the executive and Congress overlap will an individual be punished.130
Another concern raised by criminal delegations is that they decrease
the incentives that currently exist to write fewer or narrower laws. When
the executive and legislature functions are separate, Congress does not
control how its laws will be enforced. As a result, every time they write a
criminal law, members of Congress face the risk that the law will be
enforced against their interests.131 A prosecutor may bring prosecution
against a member of Congress, her family, people who donate to her
126

F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 673,
711 (2017).
127
Id.
128
See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 117, at 1734–35 (arguing that separation of
powers operates as due process in criminal cases).
129
See Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 937, 961
(2017) (“Presidents have soft-pedaled unpopular laws (or at least laws their constituents
disfavor) . . . .”); Hessick, supra note 14, at 1160–61 (using the Obama-era decision not to
enforce the immigration laws in particular contexts as an example of executive policy
diverging from legislative policy).
130
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222–23 (2011); Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
Stan. L. Rev. 869, 871, 875 (2009).
131
The prohibition on Bills of Attainder prevents Congress from writing overly targeted
criminal legislation. U.S. Const. art. I § 9.
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campaign, or some other person that the member prefers not be
prosecuted. This possibility incentivizes Congress to write fewer or more
narrow criminal laws. In contrast, when executive officials who are tasked
with enforcing a criminal law also have the ability to write the law, they
do not necessarily have the same incentives. Because the officials can rely
on their charging discretion,132 they need not worry that they or others that
they care about will be prosecuted. As a result, they have fewer incentives
to write fewer or narrow laws.
Allowing the executive to write criminal laws undermines other
structures in the Constitution aimed at protecting liberty as well. Under
Article I, legislation must be approved by a majority of both houses of
Congress and presented to the President for his signature before it
becomes law.133 Accordingly, prosecutors can bring criminal actions only
if a statute has already been approved by both houses of Congress and
signed by the President. Bicameralism and presentment slow the pace of
enactment of criminal statutes, and they may also reduce the total number
of criminal statutes that are enacted.134
Delegating the power to make criminal laws avoids these constraints.
When exercising the delegated power, an agency need not observe the
bicameralism and presentment requirements.135 Instead, it must follow
only the procedures that Congress prescribes in the law delegating the
power to the agency. And it flips bicameralism and presentment on its
head: although an agency need not abide by those procedures to
promulgate rules, Congress must do so if it wants to undo an agency
action.136 If Congress delegates its lawmaking power, bicameralism and

132

For more on that charging discretion, see infra text accompanying notes 239–256.
U.S Const. art. I § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States.”).
134
See Myers, supra note 85, at 1860–62 (criticizing the delegation of criminal rulemaking
because it “violates the constitutional notions of bicameralism and presentment,” and noting
that bicameralism and presentment “limit[] the raw amount of legislation that Congress can
pass” and thus protect liberty).
135
See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673,
707 (1997) (discussing how delegations avoid bicameralism and presentment); Laurence H.
Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 Harv. J. Legis. 1, 11
(1984) (“[A]gencies and executive officers commonly wield ‘quasi-legislative’ power without
the safeguards of bicamerality and presentment.”).
136
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952–58 (1983); Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced
Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected A Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57
Ala. L. Rev. 689, 717 (2006) (“Contrary to the flexibility given to administrative agencies, the
133
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presentment become obstacles to Congress undoing laws, not making
them.
Exacerbating this problem is that delegation increases the number of
bodies capable of producing laws.137 Unlike Congress, which must
approve each law it enacts, different agencies can work on different
problems at the same time. Thus, delegation increases the volume of
criminal laws by creating a decentralized workforce consisting of separate
bodies that can each produce criminal regulations without the
impediments specified in the Constitution.
Of course, the absence of bicameralism and presentment and the
expansion of the number of bodies capable of producing laws are hardly
limited to criminal laws. Those same issues exist whenever Congress
delegates rulemaking power to the executive: it becomes much easier to
make rules, and some of those rules will be “generally applicable rules of
conduct governing future actions by private persons.”138 Any rule that
restricts conduct could be cast as a restriction on liberty. But both criminal
law doctrine and general principles of due process tell us that the liberty
interests at stake when it comes to criminal laws and criminal punishment
are more significant, and thus deserve more protection.139

Court has required Congress to hold strictly to the lawmaking requirements in Article I,
Section 7.”).
137
See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., How Many Rules and Regulations Do Federal
Agencies
Issue?,
Forbes
(Aug.
15,
2017,
12:48
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2017/08/15/how-many-rules-and-regulations-dofederal-agencies-issue/?sh=6deb12c71e64
[https://perma.cc/6Y9J-QJ7T]
(“Federal
departments, agencies, and commissions issued 3,853 rules . . . while Congress passed and the
president signed 214 bills into law—a ratio of 18 rules for every law.”).
138
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
139
See supra Section II.A (describing the doctrines that treat criminal laws differently); see
also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (setting forth the prevailing due
process balancing test, which states that “identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail”).
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2. Accountability
A second criticism of congressional delegations is that those
delegations undermine government accountability to the public.140 The
Constitution assigns to Congress the power to make laws, and members
of Congress are held accountable to the public through periodic elections.
These elections increase the likelihood that legislative policies reflect the
will of the people, and they provide a means for the people to replace
legislators who abuse their position.
Delegating to agencies short-circuits the Constitution’s structure of
electoral accountability.141 Through delegations, members of Congress
are not directly responsible for the rules that an agency creates. Instead,
that responsibility lies with unelected agency officials. This is not to say
that the reason that Congress delegates is to avoid accountability.
Congress might delegate for other, benevolent reasons—such as an
agreement among members to develop a new policy based on expertise.142
But that motivation does not solve the problem. Even if done for good
reasons, delegation undermines the accountability mechanism established
by the Constitution.
To be sure, delegation does not absolve Congress of all public
accountability.143 Congress is responsible for enacting the statutes
delegating rulemaking power in the first place. And Congress has the

140

William D. Araiza, Reciprocal Concealed Carry: The Constitutional Issues, 46 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 571, 615 (2019) (“This principle of accountability underlies the non-delegation
doctrine.”); Caroline Cecot, Deregulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Stability, 68
Duke L.J. 1593, 1650 (2019) (“[B]road delegations to agencies may reduce political
accountability . . . .”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1748 (describing accountability
argument); cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–98 (2010)
(limiting the President’s ability to delegate his removal powers because delegation vests
authority in unelected officials).
141
See Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745, 773 (1996) (“[T]he legitimacy of statutes is
anchored by citizens’ votes for those who enact them; remote controls over those who make
rules has proved more problematic . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
142
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
Geo. L.J. 97, 133 (2000) (“[A]s students of bureaucratic politics and administrative law have
long understood, politicians delegate authority for good reason. Indeed, the decision to
delegate may represent a consensus conclusion in favor of some sort of change from the status
quo.”).
143
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1749 (“Accountability is not lost through delegation,
then; it is transformed.”).
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power to oversee agencies.144 Congress can, among other things,
subpoena agency officials to testify and require those officials to justify
unpopular policies, curtail agency power, or defund an agency. Congress
can also simply enact legislation replacing agency rules.145 To the extent
that Congress fails to provide this oversight or to reverse unpopular
agency decisions, the public might hold Congress accountable. The public
might also hold Congress accountable for initially conferring power on
an agency.
But it is unclear whether the public actually does hold Congress
accountable for its delegations or for subsequent agency actions. Research
suggests that most of the public is unfamiliar with the way in which
government is organized. For example, a recent poll found that 74% of
the public cannot name all three branches of government.146 Given the
complex legal structures establishing agencies and the lack of effort to
educate the public about agencies, it stands to reason that the public
knows little about the role of agencies and the relationship between
Congress and agencies. People might think that agencies act
independently of Congress. Or they might think that all agency actions
are directly attributable to Congress. Probably, most people have not
considered these topics at all.
Moreover, even if the public does understand Congress’s relationships
with agencies, they are unlikely to place significant responsibility on
Congress for unpopular agency decisions. Although voters may hold
Congress accountable for creating an agency that produces bad policies,
that accountability has a short lifespan. Agencies may promulgate
unpopular policies after members of the congress who voted for the initial
144
See Matthew Chou, Agency Interpretations of Executive Orders, 71 Admin. L. Rev. 555,
576 (2019) (“Congress does have many oversight tools for disapproving of agency
actions . . . .”). Although it has the power to oversee agencies, Congress has not often used
that power effectively because of “institutional and political obstacles.” Bethany A. Davis Noll
& Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 17 n.71 (2019).
145
See, e.g., Louis Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal
Rules and Informal Practices, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 51, 87–88 (1979). The Congressional
Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., codifies this process, authorizing Congress to overrule
regulations promulgated by agencies by passing a joint resolution that is signed by the
President. See Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Couns., GAO, to Senator Patrick J.
Toomey, B-329129 (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688763.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8A7-NWVG].
146
Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr. of Univ. of Pa., Americans Are Poorly Informed About Basic
Constitutional Provisions (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-are-poorly-informed-about-basic-constitutional-provisions/
[https://perma.cc/WM74-89AD].
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delegation have retired. Nor is the public as likely to lay all the blame on
Congress for unpopular agency regulations. It is one thing for members
to affirmatively approve of a policy, as they do when they vote on
legislation. It is another for members to fail to take action to overturn a
policy enacted by another, as they do when they allow an agency policy
to stand.147 Members of Congress cannot avoid responsibility for laws
they enact, but they can point the finger at the President or the agency that
promulgates an unpopular policy.148 After all, Congress may have given
the agency the power to promulgate rules, but the agency chose to
promulgate this particular rule.149 And legislatures often can blame the
failure to overturn those agency rules on the opposing party or even just
on the press of other important business.150
The dilution of accountability resulting from delegation is particularly
troublesome in the area of criminal laws because criminal laws pose a
significant opportunity for government abuse. Criminal laws provide a
powerful tool to codify prejudices or impose unwarranted burdens on
certain segments of the public. They can stamp out opposition and oppress
their opponents by enacting targeted criminal laws. And they can use
criminal laws to benefit themselves directly, by enacting statutes
prescribing punishments such as forfeiture of property. Subjecting
members of Congress to periodic elections is one of the primary
mechanisms in the Constitution to combat these potential abuses.151
147

As a general matter, people tend to blame others more for their affirmative actions than
for their omissions, even when there was a legal duty to act. See Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law 42–50 (1995).
148
One might argue that, although delegation reduces accountability, it also means that
Congress will enjoy less of the credit for successful agency policies. But that is not obviously
so because Congress often can significantly influence the narrative surrounding agency action.
See, e.g., Sarah Binder & Mark Spindel, The Myth of Independence: How Congress Governs
the Federal Reserve 45–51 (2017) (noting how Congress shifts blame onto the Federal
Reserve). In any event, that Congress might not receive credit for good agency policies does
not cure the defect of bearing less blame for bad policies.
149
Indeed, legislators sometimes escape accountability even for the laws that they
themselves write by directing political ire at the officials charged with enforcing those laws.
See Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 87, at 354 n.7 (collecting sources).
150
Further diluting congressional accountability is the increased volume of regulations that
the government can produce through delegation. The higher volume of agency regulations
allows some regulations to pass under the radar, and it may dampen public reaction against
regulations that otherwise would receive significant attention.
151
Highlighting the importance of public participation in the administration of criminal
justice is that in criminal cases the Constitution prescribes two layers of democratic
participation, in addition to the election of members of Congress who enact criminal laws.
First, the Fifth Amendment authorizes only grand juries to issue indictments. U.S. Const.
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The idea that the public should have a say about what conduct to
criminalize underlies the prohibition of federal common law crimes.152
Although judges traditionally could create common law crimes, in 1812
the Supreme Court held that federal courts could not do so.153 One reason
for this conclusion, the Court said, was that the federal government is
“made up of concessions from the several states—whatever is not
expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve.”154 And while
the states had given legislative authority to the federal government, the
Court reasoned, they did not give the courts the power to enforce common
law crimes. Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]he legislative authority of the
Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare
the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”155 More recently, the
Court has explained that “criminal punishment usually represents the
moral condemnation of the community” and therefore “legislatures and
not courts should define criminal activity.”156
The need to ensure democratic input also underlies the Constitution’s
provisions authorizing only grand juries to issue federal indictments157
and requiring trial by jury in criminal cases.158 Both requirements rest on
amend. V. Second, Article III and the Sixth Amendment require trial by jury in criminal cases.
Id. art. III, § 2; id. amend. VI.
152
See Richard J. Bonnie, Anne M. Coughlin, John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Peter W. Low, Criminal
Law 86 (2d ed. 2004) (“As the branch of government most directly responsive to the popular
will, the legislature had the power to define crimes. Judges were to enforce statutes, not make
law.”); Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for
Criminal Law 240 (1993) (“The primary value furthered by [the prohibition against commonlaw crimes] is democracy, because the justification for restricting criminal law-making to
legislatures is largely due to the more democratic selection of legislatures over judges.”).
153
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
154
Id. at 33.
155
Id. at 34.
156
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). For an argument that sounds in political
theory about why “criminalization must be democratic in its origins,” see Fissell, supra note
9, at 858, 897–905 (explaining the “liberal” theory of punishment, which legitimates only
punishment derived from consent to be governed by political institutions).
157
U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury[.]”); see also Roger
A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 703, 726
(2008) (arguing that the grand jury plays a structural role in the Constitution as a check on the
three branches of government and as a moderator of criminal law federalism); Niki Kuckes,
The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury,
94 Geo. L.J. 1265, 1270 (2006) (arguing that the grand jury is best understood as a “democratic
prosecutor”).
158
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
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the belief that the public should operate as a check on the imposition of
criminal punishment.159
One might argue that, even if Congress is not sufficiently held
accountable for criminal laws produced through delegations, the agencies
that produce them are.160 But that is not so. The principal way in which
agencies allow for public participation is through procedures, such as
notice and comment. These procedures are guaranteed by statutes, such
as the APA, that authorize judicial review to enforce these legal
requirements.161 But these procedures do not give the public any
significant control over agency decisions; they merely oblige agencies to
offer an opportunity for public comment.162 An agency set on
implementing a particular policy may adopt that policy regardless of the
public’s comments, unless there is no valid reason for a policy.163
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); see also Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (referring to the jury as the “circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery
of justice”); Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal
Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1413, 1417 (2017) (arguing that the jury right was intended to
provide local, democratic input into the criminal justice system).
159
Richard E. Myers II, Who Watches the Watchers in Public Corruption Cases?, 2012 U.
Chi. Legal F. 13, 14 (2012) (“Choosing public individuals to participate in the criminal justice
system is a very old idea—one enshrined in the grand jury and petit jury provisions of the
Constitution.”).
160
Of course, agencies are indirectly accountable to the public insofar as they are answerable
to Congress and the President for the rules they promulgate. But that layer of separation
significantly reduces the influence of the public. It was precisely for this reason that the
original Constitution left the appointment of senators to state legislatures. Doing so reduced
the pressure on senators to placate the public. In any event, the indirect accountability of
agencies depends on those politicians’ accountability to the public for the agency’s policies—
which as noted earlier is unlikely to be substantial, see supra text accompanying notes 146–
150.
161
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702; Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 Vand. L. Rev.
825, 881 (2019) (noting that agencies are “substantially constrained by the procedural
strictures of the APA enforced by judicial review”).
162
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing that agencies must “give interested persons an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through” comments, but not requiring agencies to modify
regulation because of comments).
163
David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 329, 337 (2014)
(explaining that, because informal rulemaking permits agencies to formulate rules based on
their experience and knowledge, “[m]any agencies have . . . determin[ed] that they are free to
ignore comments submitted during informal rulemaking proceedings and promulgate
regulations based on their own expertise”); see also Kristina Daugirdas, Evaluating Remand
Without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 278, 279 (2005) (noting that, when a court vacates an agency rule as for not adequately
addressing comments, “the agency can cure the defects by repromulgating the same rule with
a different rationale”).
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As a practical matter, Congress often exempts criminal law delegations
from these procedures, reducing the already weak public accountability.
SORNA provides an example. It confers discretion on the Attorney
General to determine whether to apply registration requirements, and it
does not provide for judicial review of that decision.164 The Controlled
Substances Act is similar. Although the Act requires the Attorney General
to follow notice and comment in designating drugs as illegal, it does not
permit judicial review of that determination.165 So too with the Sentencing
Reform Act, which authorizes the Sentencing Commission to promulgate
sentencing guidelines. The Act requires the Commission to follow notice
and comment in issuing guidelines,166 but it does not permit judicial
review of the guidelines the Commission promulgates.167
3. Notice
Another argument against delegation is that it results in less notice to
the public of their legal obligations.168 Individuals are deemed to have
notice of laws enacted by the government. This notice, of course, is only
constructive.169 It rests on several fictions: that individuals actually know
where to find new laws once they are published, that individuals take the
time and effort to actually read those laws, and that laypeople can
understand the substantive scope of those laws. Despite these fictions, the
idea of constructive notice endures because it prevents individuals from
164

34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
166
28 U.S.C. § 994(x).
167
The Act contains:
no provision for citizens or other affected persons to obtain judicial review of the final
rules issued by the sentencing commission (as the federal Administrative Procedure Act
provides with respect to executive branch agencies where the rules are alleged to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts
40 (1998); see also id. at 208–09 (contrasting 5 U.S.C. § 706, the portion of the APA which
provides for judicial review of regulations, with S. Rep. No. 225, at180–81 (1983), which
states that the sentencing guidelines are not subject to judicial review because “[t]here is ample
provision for review of the guidelines by the Congress and the public; no additional review of
the guidelines as a whole is either necessary or desirable”).
168
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–35 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the division of powers in the government tends to “provide stability and fair
notice”).
169
E.g., Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (Story, J.) (noting that
“[i]t is a common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any
person, either civilly or criminally”).
165
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escaping liability by avoiding reading the law, and it avoids difficult
problems of proving what a defendant knew.
Delegation exacerbates this fiction. First, delegation allows the law to
change more quickly. One reason for the bicameralism and presentment
requirements in the Constitution is to slow the rate of legal change.170
Those procedures do not apply to agencies.171 Although Congress can
choose to impose additional requirements by statutes, it need not do so,
and it often does not do so. Consequently, agencies can change laws more
quickly than Congress can. Second, delegation increases the rate at which
the government can generate rules. The increased volume of rules makes
it more difficult for individuals to be aware of all the laws. Of course, the
increased speed and larger capacity of agencies to make rules are seen as
a feature, not a bug, in administrative law.172 But the additional speed and
volume make it more difficult for the public to keep apprised of the law.
This difficulty with keeping apprised of the law raises due process
concerns. A basic feature of due process is that individuals should have
fair notice of their legal obligations.173 Notice allows members of the
public to conform their behavior to the law—as a result, people are better
able to avoid accidentally violating the law, and they are also less likely
to forgo engaging in lawful activity out of fear that it might be illegal.
Although due process demands notice for all legal obligations affecting
life, liberty, or property,174 the law imposes stricter notice requirements

170

See The Federalist No. 62, at 378, 380 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that Article I designed Congress to slow new enactments because “continual change
even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of
success”).
171
See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
172
See infra Subsection II.C.3 (discussing efficiency as a reason in favor of delegation).
173
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1225 (2018); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
174
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1225 (noting notice obligations apply to civil and criminal cases).
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for criminal laws.175 One example comes from the ex post facto clauses.176
Those clauses prohibit retroactive criminal laws in order “to prevent
prosecution and punishment without fair warning.”177 The same limitation
does not extend to civil laws. In contrast to the absolute prohibition on
retroactive criminal laws,178 courts will allow retroactive application of a
civil statute if the legislature “made clear its intent” that the law apply
retroactively.179
The greater demand for notice in criminal cases also underlies the void
for vagueness doctrine. That doctrine prohibits overly vague criminal
statutes in part because vague laws give insufficient notice to citizens
about what conduct is permitted and what conduct is prohibited.180 “The
degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative

175

Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 335, 338–39 (2005). Due process requires two types of notice. The first type of notice
ensures that individuals have notice of what the law requires. A second type of notice—called
“adversarial notice”—is the notice that the government must provide the accused when it
brings charges against them. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights
at Sentencing, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 187, 210 (2014). Delegation implicates the first kind
of notice. But it bears noting that the Constitution also imposes more stringent requirements
for this adversarial notice in criminal cases than in civil cases. Compare, e.g., Russell v. United
States, 369 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1962) (stating that the Fifth Amendment indictment
requirement requires allegations of the specific elements of the charged crime), with Am.
Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011)
(noting that notice pleading does not require a plaintiff to specifically plead every element of
his cause of action).
176
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I., § 10, cl. 1.
177
United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 96 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Devine v. N.M. Dep’t
of Corr., 866 F.2d 339, 344 (10th Cir. 1989)). The prohibition also prevents vindictive
legislation. Id.
178
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798).
179
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). There was, in the early days of
the Republic, disagreement about whether the ex post facto clauses extended to civil statutes
as well. See Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81
Ky. L.J. 323, 327–33 (1992) (collecting sources). But early cases interpreted the clauses to
extend only to criminal cases. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Constitutional Constraints on
Retroactive Civil Legislation: The Hollow Promises of the Federal Constitution and
Unrealized Potential of State Constitutions, 14 Nev. L.J. 63, 66–68 (2013).
180
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as
we have called it, guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute
proscribes.”); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (“The doctrine incorporates notions
of fair notice or warning.”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)
(“[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we
insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning.”).
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importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the
nature of the enactment.”181 As a result, the vagueness doctrine ordinarily
applies with less force to civil statutes, the Court has explained, “because
the consequences of imprecision” for violation of civil statutes “are
qualitatively less severe.”182
The more stringent demands for notice in criminal cases push towards
greater restrictions on delegation of the power to promulgate criminal
regulations. Delegation leads to less notice of legal obligations because
of the speed with which agencies can adopt regulations and because of
the larger volume of rules they can adopt. Thus, delegation of criminal
rulemaking power will tend to result in less notice of the criminal
restrictions to the public.
Delegating the power to promulgate criminal regulations raises a
second notice problem—one that directly implicates the vagueness
doctrine. Under the current theory of delegation, the law that supposedly
prohibits activities is the statute delegating power to the executive.183 The
rule created by the agency merely implements that law.184 As the Court
put it in Whitman v. American Trucking, because the Constitution
“permits no delegation of” legislative powers,185 rulemakings are
constitutional insofar as they consist of “executing or applying the
law.”186 In other words, the legal fiction underlying the modern
nondelegation doctrine is that the only “law” is the statute that Congress
enacted; an agency’s regulations exist only to guide the enforcement of
that law.187
181

Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
Id. at 498–99 (expressing “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal
penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe”). There are
some exceptions to the greater tolerance for vague civil statutes, including removal cases, see
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213 (“[T]he most exacting vagueness standard should apply in removal
cases.”), and civil statutes that infringe on First Amendment rights, see Hoffman Ests., 455
U.S. at 499.
183
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 472.
186
Id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)); see also Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849,
1855 (2019) (“When a grant to executive officers accords with the nondelegation doctrine, it
will be deemed, by definition, a grant of constitutionally permissible rulemaking authority—
an executive power––not the transfer of a legislative power vested in Congress.”).
187
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693–94 (1892) (“The true distinction . . . is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
182
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By this logic, the only “law” that criminalizes conduct are
congressional statutes that prohibit and punish certain activities. Those
statutes regulate social behavior by dictating what is forbidden and the
consequences for violating those restrictions. Regulations, on the other
hand, merely implement those prohibitions.
But statutes that delegate criminal rulemaking authority invariably
contain ambiguities. The reason for congressional delegations of power is
to confer policy power on agencies.188 But agencies cannot make policy
decisions without discretion. Thus, even when a delegating statute clearly
sets out the goals an agency should seek to advance through rulemaking,
the statute is ambiguous insofar as they leave it to the agency to decide
what rules to promulgate to implement those goals.
While the law tolerates some ambiguity in criminal statutes, the
vagueness doctrine places constitutional limits on that ambiguity. Most
statutes delegating criminal authority provide little guidance about what
actually is illegal. And while that guidance may satisfy the intelligible
principle doctrine, the vagueness doctrine likely requires more clarity.
The intelligible principles Congress provides in many statutes are
extremely broad and vague.189 For example, in Grimaud, the statute in
question permitted the executive only “to regulate the[] occupancy and
use” of the lands in a manner that “protect[s] against destruction by fire
and depredations,” and it imposed criminal penalties for failing to comply
with those regulations.190 The statutory language provides virtually no
guidance about what is prohibited; the Secretary decided to use his
regulatory power to require permits for grazing sheep. But the statutory
pursuance of the law.” (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville, R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs
of Clinton Cnty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88–89 (1852))).
188
The reasons for assigning policymaking power to agencies range from the laudable, like
taking advantage of agency expertise, to the more regrettable, like avoiding political
responsibility. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
189
See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475–76 (upholding a statute that granted the EPA broad
discretion to set national ambient air quality standards at levels “‘requisite’ . . . to protect the
public health”); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (upholding
delegation to the SEC to take such actions as necessary to prevent companies from “unfairly
or inequitably distribut[ing] voting power among security holders” (quoting Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(2))); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 420, 423 (1944) (upholding a delegation to fix commodity prices that are “generally fair
and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act” (quoting Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. § 902)); see also David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of
Law, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 168, 225 (2018) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine is famously
toothless; just about anything counts as an intelligible principle.”).
190
220 U.S. 506, 509 (1911) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 551).
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language alone almost certainly would fail the void for vagueness test.
Indeed, the district court judge who dismissed the indictment against
Grimaud did so not only on nondelegation grounds but also on the
grounds that the statute was “void” because it failed to “define the acts to
be punished” and thus did not give people sufficient notice about what
acts were illegal.191
More important, even those statutes that do contain fairly clear
guidance for agencies still raise notice problems. That is because those
statutes do not actually notify the public of what is illegal. The statute
leaves that task to the agency. For example, as the Supreme Court itself
noted in discussing SORNA, if the Attorney General had not written rules
requiring pre-Act offenders to register, it would not have been a federal
offense for those offenders not to register.192 The statute itself, therefore,
does not provide notice of what is illegal and legal. It provides notice only
that someone else will determine what is illegal and legal.
Some might say that the regulations that are written by the agency
provide sufficient notice to individuals. The Court itself made such an
argument in an earlier case discussing the Attorney General’s rules under
SORNA.193 But unless the Court decides to revisit current delegation
theory, the relevant law is the delegating statute. Just as a prosecutor
cannot cure the defects of a vague statute by adopting internal
enforcement guidelines,194 an agency’s regulation should not be able to
supply notice of what a statute proscribes.
C. Reasons in Favor of Delegation
Even the reasons that are traditionally offered in support of broad
delegations to agencies do not support—or at least do not strongly
support—delegations in the criminal law. Those reasons are expertise,
compromise, and efficiency.

191

United States v. Grimaud, 170 F. 205, 206–10 (S.D. Cal. 1909), rev’d, 220 U.S. 506
(1911).
192
Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 440 (2012).
193
Id. at 441–42 (“A ruling from the Attorney General, however, could diminish or
eliminate those uncertainties, thereby helping to eliminate the very kind of vagueness and
uncertainty that criminal law must seek to avoid.”).
194
Cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58–59, 63–64 (Ill. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S.
41 (1999) (rejecting an argument that police enforcement guidelines could save a statute from
a vagueness challenge).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

322

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:281

1. Expertise
The expertise of agency officials is one of the traditional justifications
for delegating rulemaking authority to agencies.195 The idea is that
agencies will be staffed with scientists and industry professionals who
have that knowledge and training to address complex social problems—
knowledge and training that Congress lacks.196 Armed with this expertise,
agencies have the capability to draft more sophisticated, nuanced, and
detailed policies than Congress.
But administrative expertise is not a sufficient basis for promulgating
criminal rules, especially not under prevailing practices and norms.197 It
is said that criminal law rests on two overarching theories of
punishment—retributivism and utilitarianism.198 Under retributivism,
criminal laws embody moral judgments about severity of harm and
offender blameworthiness.199 Individuals are punished for their criminal

195

Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with
Presidential Power, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2019, 2024 (2015) (“The conception of the agencyas-expert is one of the cornerstones of the U.S. administrative process . . . .”); Kathryn A.
Watts, Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 14
(2009) (arguing that arbitrary-and-capricious review views agencies as experts); see also
Strauss, supra note 141, at 773 (tracing the evolution of the expertise justification for
delegations to agencies).
196
This expertise includes not only knowledge of background facts but also of processes
and scientific tools. For example, in determining the carcinogenic potency of chemicals in the
face of uncertainty, an agency employed the Bayesian Monte Carlo analysis—a tool that is
almost certainly unknown to most members of Congress. See Adam M. Finkel, The Cost of
Nothing Trumps the Value of Everything: The Failure of Regulatory Economics to Keep Pace
with Improvements in Quantitative Risk Analysis, 4 Mich. J. Env’t & Admin. L. 91, 129
(2014). Although the understanding of agency expertise has morphed over time, expertise
continues to be a major reason for assigning power to agencies. See Wagner, supra note 195,
at 2027–28 (2015) (describing the changing view of agency expertise).
197
See Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative
Federalism, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 993, 1011 (2010) (noting that “the need for technical
expertise, a commonly voiced justification for agency delegation,” is “largely absent” in
criminal law); Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism, supra note 9, at 115 n.367 (noting that
criminal law delegations “lack the technical complexity that typically justifies delegation
based on agency expertise”); Strauss, supra note 141, at 747 (stating that legislatures regularly
directly resolve substantive issues by enacting criminal statutes instead of delegating to agency
experts).
198
Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Carol S. Steiker, Criminal Law and Its
Processes: Cases and Materials 79 (8th ed. 2007).
199
Andrew Ashworth, Desert, in Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy
180, 181, 182 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); George P. Fletcher,
Rethinking Criminal Law 461 (1978).
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acts because they deserve punishment.200 Under utilitarianism, criminal
rules exist to reduce the occurrence of future crimes. Punishment is a
means to prevent future crime through deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation.201
The agency-as-expert justification does not support the power to
promulgate criminal rules based on retributivism. The expertise
justification for agencies is that their conclusions rest on objective data
and methodologies. Moral judgments do not depend on those scientific
methods.202 Because there is no objectively correct answer to whom
deserves punishment or how much they deserve, there are no “experts” in
retributivism.203
Utilitarianism provides a stronger case for delegating the power to
promulgate criminal rules than retributivism. In contrast to retributivism’s
focus on morality, utilitarianism punishes to prevent future crime. What
will or will not reduce crime is an empirical question, and the idea that
legislative decisions often turn on empirical questions underlies the
expertise justification for delegation to agencies.204 The idea is that
agencies will rely on objective information and methodologies when
drafting regulations, and thus they are in a better position to answer
empirical questions. For example, agencies regularly consider costs and
benefits when promulgating regulations.205
Although utilitarianism depends on an empirical question—what is
more likely to reduce future crime—that does not mean that agencies
necessarily have the appropriate expertise to promulgate criminal rules.
200
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Principled Sentencing, supra note
199, at 188; Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1240 (2005).
201
Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 67, 70 (2005); see also Kadish
et al., supra note 198, at 79–105 (collecting materials).
202
Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 197, 209–11
(1965) (exploring the relationship between popular morality and use of criminal sanctions in
regulating business practices).
203
See Rachel Elise Barkow, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration
39 (2019) (“There is no objective way to decide which argument is right as a matter of
retributive justice, nor can we say anyone is an expert on the issue . . . .”).
204
Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 103 Minn.
L. Rev. 2255, 2336 (2019) (“New Dealers envisioned agencies as expert, professional bodies
capable of analyzing social and economic problems and relying on scientific and empirical
information that courts and legislatures lack capacity to fully consider.”).
205
Cecot, supra note 140, at 1600 (documenting the “increasing importance in agency
rulemakings”).
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That is because the utilitarianism approach to crime does not care only
about what methods will reduce crime, but it also cares about the relative
costs of those methods as compared to the benefit of reduced crime.206
And agencies do not have relevant expertise in determining the costs and
benefits of criminal sanctions. Their expertise is in the substantive area
that they regulate—such as the environment, the securities markets, and
the airwaves. They do not specialize in determining either the benefits of
criminal prohibitions to potential victims and communities or the costs of
criminal convictions to offenders, their families and communities, and the
department of prisons.
There are, at least arguably, two agencies that possess relevant
expertise: the Sentencing Commission and the Department of Justice. The
focus of both agencies is on the federal criminal justice system. But these
agencies have, at best, incomplete expertise. Neither agency has
undertaken to assess all the costs and benefits of criminalization. And
research suggests that the criminal regulations that the Department of
Justice issues may be based less on expertise and more on a desire to
facilitate law enforcement by providing more options in charging
individuals.207
Even if other agencies did have expertise in assessing the costs and
benefits of criminal law, statutes delegating criminal rulemaking do not
authorize agencies to utilize that expertise. Most delegating statutes give
agencies the authority to prescribe substantive standards; they do not also
authorize the agency to set the punishment for violating that substantive
standard. For example, federal law assigns to the Secretary of the Interior
the power to issue regulations protecting marine mammals, but not the
power to set criminal punishment for violating those rules.208 Nor is the
punishment supposed to factor into the Secretary’s rulemaking. The Act
requires the Secretary to regulate based on “the best scientific evidence
available” to prevent unduly harming marine life.209 It does not empower

206

All of the utilitarian theories seek to identify optimal levels of punishment—namely
“how to best balance any reduction in the costs of crime with the attendant increase in the
costs of enforcement.” John F. Pfaff, Sentencing Law and Policy 38 (2016). For example, we
can reduce jaywalking to zero by preemptively placing every individual in prison; but the cost
of that measure outweighs the benefit of eliminating jaywalking.
207
See Barkow, supra note 203, at 6–8, 53–54 (describing prosecutorial lobbying); Rachel
E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 728–29 (2005) (same).
208
16 U.S.C. § 1375(b).
209
Id. § 1373.
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the Secretary to consider the cost of the criminal consequences of
violating whatever regulations are promulgated.
In any event, even if Congress created an agency with the expertise to
promulgate substantive standards and the punishment for violating those
standards, that agency’s expertise would still fail to justify criminal
regulation under a theory of retributivism.
2. Promoting Compromise
Another justification for agency delegation is that it allows lawmakers
to compromise.210 Congress consists of a large body of members with
different ideologies and representing different interests from across the
country. As a result, a majority of the two houses is often unable to reach
an agreement on the standards to impose through legislation.211
Delegating rulemaking authority to an agency to implement a statute
provides a path to compromise. Disagreeing members can agree to
delegate authority, hoping that the agency will adopt regulations
implementing their own policy visions.212 Indeed, that is what appears to
have prompted the delegations at issue in both Gundy213 and Grimaud.214
210

John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev.
1939, 1985 (2011) (observing that delegation “is a common drafting strategy to elide
disagreement or deal with hard-to-predict futures”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory
Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 217, 218 (1992) (discussing
the use of delegation to handle legislative disagreement); see also Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (criticizing Congress for
delegating “simply [to] avoid[] a choice which was both fundamental for purposes of the
statute and yet politically so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult,
if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge”); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S.
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 575, 594–96 (2002) (describing a study finding that Congress deliberately writes
ambiguous laws for others to interpret as a compromise).
211
Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L.J. 1407, 1429–30 (2017).
212
Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 Admin. L. Rev. 65, 123
n.282 (2015) (discussing this phenomenon of “regulatory lottery”).
213
See Brief for Petitioner at 6–8, Gundy v. United States (2018) (No. 17-6086) (describing
legislative history of SORNA); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Because Congress could not achieve the consensus necessary to
resolve the hard problems associated with SORNA’s application to pre-Act offenders, it
passed the potato to the Attorney General.”); Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed
Promise of Administrative Federalism, supra note 197, at 999–1000 (describing the question
whether to retroactively apply SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as a
“controversial issue with major policy significance and practical ramifications for states”).
214
When Congress decided to provide the Department of the Interior (and later the
Department of Agriculture) the authority to regulate the forests, it avoided “any specific
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This justification turns the law’s approach to criminal punishment on
its head. A major theme of the Constitution is to protect individual liberty
by constraining government power.215 Some constraints are in the form of
absolute prohibitions on the exercise of power in certain ways, like the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. But
others simply make it more difficult for the government to exercise its
power. One example of this is the bicameralism requirement. Requiring
both houses of Congress to approve a law ensures that only broadly
accepted measures would become law.216 Delegating the power to
establish criminal standards circumvents this structure. It changes the
default in the case of a lack of widespread agreement. Without agencies,
the lack of agreement would mean no exercise of government power. But
with agency delegation, lawmakers can agree to exercise power without
agreeing how to exercise it. That makes the exercise of government power
more likely than before.
More generally, the separation of powers and other constitutional
guarantees, such as the right to the jury trial, help to ensure that many
actors must agree before an individual is subject to punishment.217 The
legislature must decide conduct is worthy of criminalization, the
prosecutor must decide to bring charges in a particular case, the grand
jury must decide to indict, the judge must agree that the defendant’s
conduct falls within the statute, and every member of the jury must agree
to convict.218 Any of those actors can prevent the imposition of

mention” of grazing because grazing was such a controversial issue, and government efforts
to regulate it were opposed by “western interests in Congress.” See Sawyer, supra note 9, at
180–81, 189; see also id. at 187–88 (noting that the Department of the Interior twice asked
Congress for a statute criminalizing the “pastur[ing of] livestock in a national forest without a
permit,” but Congress “took no action, likely due to the same political conflict that had kept
any specific mention of grazing out of the Act of June 4th”).
215
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
216
Litman, supra note 211, at 1429.
217
See Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 171, 191–203 (2019)
(discussing the power of multiple, overlapping actors in the criminal justice system).
218
Despite the unanimity requirement’s lengthy historical pedigree, see, e.g., 1 W.
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 318 (1922), the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a
unanimous jury verdict is not constitutionally required, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972). Notably, the Court reconsidered that ruling last Term. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140
S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires a
unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense).
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punishment, and (with few exceptions) we do not expect them to negotiate
and compromise with one another.219
3. Efficiency
Dispersing regulatory authority to agencies allows the federal
government to produce a greater volume of regulations more quickly and
cost effectively than it could if Congress alone enacted laws.220 This
efficiency is desirable, the argument goes, because it allows the
government to handle complicated modern problems expeditiously as
they arise.221
But this argument is less convincing when it comes to criminal law.
That is because efficiency is in direct tension with liberty. As noted above,
the more government exercises power—especially power backed up by
the threat of criminal punishment—the further we drift from the
constraints in the Constitution that are meant to protect liberty.222
In addition, the need to delegate in order to achieve efficiency is much
smaller in the realm of criminal laws. Legislatures generally, and
Congress in particular, have proven to be remarkably proficient and
efficient in the enactment of criminal laws.223 Members of Congress and
those who seek election to Congress routinely exploit crime for political
gain. As Dan Richman has noted, crime legislation essentially serves as
campaign literature for legislators.224 Because there is no organized lobby
against criminal legislation, members of Congress face little or no
pressure to vote against new criminal laws; but they do face charges of
219
We do expect negotiation and compromise between legislators and between jurors. But
we do not expect, for example, the legislature to negotiate and compromise with the jury.
220
See supra text accompanying notes 133–137.
221
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to
Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 391, 404 (1987) (“Given the nature and level of
government intervention that Congress now authorizes, it could not possibly make the
hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of important policy decisions that agencies make annually.”);
Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323, 341–42 (1987)
(arguing that congressional legislation does not meet the needs of modern society).
222
See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text.
223
See, e.g., Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How Congress is Eroding
the Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law (2010); Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal
Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 45, 78 (1998); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 710–11 (2005); Julie R.
O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction as a Case Study, 96 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 648–49 (2006).
224
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757, 774 (1999).
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being soft on crime unless they vote in favor of more criminal laws.225 As
a result, Congress passes new criminal laws at an alarmingly fast rate.226
One study of federal legislation calculated that, between 2000 and 2007,
Congress created an average of fifty-six new crimes each year.227 Another
study calculated that criminal statutes were enacted at a rate that was 45%
higher than all other types of legislation.228 What is more, many of these
statutes target behavior that is already criminal under federal law.229
Together, this information suggests that, far from needing to be more
efficient, Congress enacts more criminal laws than are necessary.
Finally, while there is a compelling argument to be made that the
government must be able to respond expeditiously to the complicated
problems of modern society, the argument is far less compelling that the
expeditious response must include criminal sanctions. Indeed, noncriminal law responses are often quite effective at significantly reducing
undesirable behavior.230
Take, for example, the risk caused by cars that drive too fast. We can
reduce that risk through criminalization—by making driving above a
certain speed illegal and ticketing those who speed. But we can also
reduce speeding by making it more physically difficult or uncomfortable

225
See Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law 15 (2008)
(noting that “neither political party has been willing to allow the other to earn the reputation
of being tougher on crime”); William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice
173 (2011) (“When writing and enacting criminal prohibitions, legislators usually ignore
tradeoffs and rarely need to compromise. Save for law enforcement lobbies, few organized,
well-funded interest groups take an interest in criminal statutes; criminal defendants’ interests
nearly always go unpresented in legislative hallways.”); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to
Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the
Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 41–43 (1997) (recounting
that Democrats “realized in the 1990s that their traditional support of more liberal crime
policies had become a major political liability” and describing how “Democratic
Congressional leaders deliberately adopted a strategy of taking the crime issue away from the
Republicans”).
226
O’Sullivan, supra note 223, at 653–54 (comparing studies of the quantity of federal
crimes from the mid-1970s and 1998 and showing considerable increase).
227
John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes 1 (Heritage
Found., Legal Memorandum No. 26, 2008).
228
Walsh & Joslyn, supra note 223, at 13.
229
See O’Sullivan, supra note 223, at 679–85 (using obstruction of justice crimes as a case
study of this phenomenon).
230
See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2d ed. 2009); see also Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The
Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 617, 619–21 (2015) (arguing that nudges are a
more cost-effective way to improve tax compliance than audits and penalties).
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to speed. For example, some communities reduce fast driving by
installing speed bumps. Studies show that those speed bumps not only
reduce the speed at which people drive, but also leave lingering effects
when the speed bump is later removed.231
Another, related, way to combat speeding is to make it psychologically
uncomfortable. Cities in South America have experimented with this
approach—using mockery and comedy to enforce better driving
behavior.232 Some communities opt for reinforcing safe behavior. In
Stockholm, Sweden, for example, the government uses its traffic cameras
not only to detect speeding but also to reward those who drive at or below
the speed limit by entering them into a lottery for prizes. The program has
been proven to reduce driving speeds.233
As these examples illustrate, there are many options other than
criminalization and punishment to change behavior. And if executive
agencies are not given the ability to criminalize behavior, perhaps they
will choose to embrace noncriminal alternatives.
III. THE CHARGING POWER AND IMPLICIT DELEGATIONS
Some might say that the delegation of criminal rulemaking power is
unobjectionable because it is consistent with a broader phenomenon in
American criminal law—namely, that Congress delegates significant
policy discretion to executive officials while courts routinely decline to
place any meaningful limits on that discretion. Congress has delegated
this significant discretion through the enactment of expansive criminal
codes, through overlapping statutes, and through broadly worded statutes.
The enormous policy discretion that is implicitly delegated through these

231
See, e.g., Shauna Hallmark, Keith Knapp & Gary Thomas, Off. of Traffic and Safety,
Iowa Dep’t of Transp., Temporary Speed Hump Impact Evaluation (2002),
https://nacto.org/docs/usdg/temporary_speed_humps_impact_evaluation_hallmark.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YB2V-SGK2].
232
In the 1990s, the mayor of Bogotá, Colombia, sent mimes onto city streets to tease and
shame the city’s drivers for breaking traffic rules. The initiative is credited with reducing
traffic fatalities. More recently, in La Paz, Bolivia, volunteers dress in zebra costumes to help
direct traffic and assist pedestrians in crossing the street. The zebras use comedy to nudge
drivers towards better driving habits, including “if a car stops in the crosswalk, they will lay
across [the driver’s] hood.” Isabel Henderson, Big in Bolivia: Zebras in the Streets, Atlantic,
Mar. 2017, at 26.
233
Charlie Sorrel, Swedish Speed-Camera Pays Drivers to Slow Down, Wired (Dec. 6,
2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/12/swedish-speed-camera-pays-drivers-to-slow-down/
[https://perma.cc/CRY7-2WH6].
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means raises many of the same concerns as explicit delegations of
criminal rulemaking power.
But the explicit delegation of criminal rulemaking power is different in
kind. While executive discretion is a necessary byproduct of prosecutors’
charging power, that is simply not the case for the discretion afforded in
rulemaking. And although the concerns associated with implicit
delegations from expansive criminal codes overlap with the concerns
associated with explicit delegations to promulgate criminal rules, there is
no reason to tolerate the latter simply because we permit the former.
Unlike the power to make rules, the power to bring criminal charges is
a core executive power.234 Since the late 1700s, federal law has authorized
only executive officials to pursue federal criminal charges,235 and the
Court has long recognized that those officials have discretion in deciding
whether to arrest and whether to bring charges.236 These charging
decisions necessarily require the executive to make policy decisions.
Imagine, for example, a prosecutor who is faced with a decision whether
to bring charges in two separate cases: one of those cases involves a minor
crime, such as jaywalking, while the other involves a more serious crime,
such as murder. Both cases have comparable evidence available, and
neither is a slam dunk. One would not expect the prosecutor to be equally
inclined to bring charges in both cases. She might be less inclined to bring
the jaywalking case because jaywalking is such a minor offense that
pursuing charges is not worth the hassle, and she might be more inclined
to charge murder because murder is a major crime. Or she might be less
inclined to bring the murder charges than the jaywalking charges because
she is worried about the consequences of charging a defendant with
murder if she is not sure of the defendant’s guilt.
Policy choices of this sort are inevitable in the exercise of charging
power. Prosecutors must make decisions about which cases to pursue
based on the strength of available evidence. They also must make choices
because they do not have enough resources to enforce the law every time

234

See infra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.
The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1869) (“[C]ourts will not recognize any suit,
civil or criminal, as regularly before them, if prosecuted in the name and for the benefit of the
United States, unless the same is represented by the district attorney, or some one designated
by him to attend to such business . . . .”).
236
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (stating that the power not to indict is “a
decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch”); see
also United States v. Corrie, 25 F. Cas. 658, 668 (C.C.D. S.C. 1860) (No. 14,869).
235
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it is violated.237 These resource constraints may lead law enforcement to
prioritize one type of crime over another. It also may lead them to focus
on particularly egregious violations of the law. For example, police
cannot stop and ticket every driver who goes one or two miles above the
speed limit—there are simply too many drivers who do so. Instead, law
enforcement must prioritize those drivers who drive significantly faster
than the speed limit. As a result, drivers know that that they will not get
pulled over if they drive thirty-six miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-perhour zone. Officers will enforce the law only if a driver exceeds the speed
limit by some larger amount—say ten miles per hour. Through these
charging decisions, the executive sets the “real” speed limit on the road
as forty-five instead of thirty-five miles per hour.238
This policy discretion is not limited to deciding which kind of criminal
behavior to target; it also includes decisions about which individuals to
arrest and to prosecute. For some laws, police arrest and prosecutors
pursue charges against only some small fraction of the population that
violates those laws.239 The executive therefore may opt to prosecute one
person for a crime while letting another who commits the same offense
go free.
Executive policy decisions have played an increasingly important role
as the federal criminal code has expanded. Because the executive does not
have sufficient resources to enforce all of the already-existing criminal
statutes all the time, every time that Congress enacts a new criminal law,
it increases the policy power of the executive.
Another way in which Congress has expanded the role of executive
officials in setting criminal policy is through the enactment of overlapping
237
See Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 221, 222, 224 (2003) (noting that “resources, even at
the national level, are scarce” and that scarcity “dictate[s] that prosecutors will be unable to
pursue each matter that is placed upon their desk for consideration”); see also Robert L. Rabin,
Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 1036, 1050 (1972) (noting that violations of federal statute making
it illegal to transport a motor vehicle across state lines “are so numerous that the Justice
Department has taken the unusual step of explicitly establishing a selective enforcement policy
in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, insulating major categories of violators from prosecution”).
238
See William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the
Rule of Law, in Criminal Procedure Stories 378 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (“The real law,
the ‘rules’ that determine who goes to prison and for how long, is not written in code books
or case reports. Prosecutors . . . define it by the decisions they make when ordering off the
menus their states’ legislatures have given them.”).
239
See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 237, at 1091 (reporting prosecutorial declination rates as high
as 90% for some types of federal crimes).
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criminal laws that cover the same conduct but that carry different
penalties. Consider, for example, the current federal regime that governs
possession of child pornography. The federal code prohibits the receipt
and possession of child pornography. But receipt carries a mandatory
minimum sentence,240 while possession does not.241 Although receipt and
possession are distinct crimes—they have different elements—in
essentially every case an individual who possesses child pornography
could be charged with receipt.242 Thus, these federal laws implicitly
delegate to the executive the power to determine how much to punish the
possession of child pornography. An executive who wants to be harsh
towards child pornography possession may bring charges under the
receipt statute, while others will bring charges under the possession
statute.243
Likewise, Congress has implicitly delegated policy power to the
executive by enacting overly broad criminal laws—laws that reach
beyond the conduct that Congress meant to prohibit and that include less
blameworthy (or even innocuous) behavior.244 Consider the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which was enacted to
240

18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1).
Id. § 2252(b)(2).
242
This is especially simple in cases involving computer images. The same evidence that
would establish knowing possession—namely, digital evidence that the defendant
downloaded the image—would also establish knowing receipt. One possible exception is an
individual who inadvertently came into possession of child pornography images, discovered
the images, and then decided to keep them. That person would be guilty of knowing
possession, but not knowing receipt.
243
A report by the U.S. Sentencing Commission showed that prosecutors are making this
decision in an arbitrary fashion. The Commission’s exhaustive study of a large set of child
pornography cases revealed no apparent enforcement criteria distinguishing those defendants
who were charged with receipt from those defendants who were charged only with possession.
Instead, prosecutors appeared to use the two laws as a source of leverage for plea bargaining—
requiring defendants to plead guilty to possession or be charged with receipt and face the
mandatory minimum sentence. See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography
Offenses 144–67 (2012).
244
See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1493 (2008)
(noting that most critiques of overly broad laws focus on statutes that “extend[] criminal
sanctions beyond culpable actors who pose a genuine risk to others”); Sanford H. Kadish,
Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 909–
10 (1962) (identifying the phenomenon of “overcriminalization,” namely, the proliferation of
“criminal statutes which seem deliberately to overcriminalize, in the sense of encompassing
conduct not the target of legislative concern”); see also Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1678
(2010) (“A criminal is normatively innocent where his conduct is undeserving of communal
condemnation, even if it is contrary to law.”).
241
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eliminate “weapons of mass destruction.”245 The statute forbids anyone
from knowingly possessing or using “any chemical weapon,”246 and it
defines “chemical weapon” as “any chemical” that “can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”247
That definition sweeps so broadly as to include everyday cleaning
supplies.248 No doubt, Congress did not intend to turn every person who
owns cleaning supplies into a felon. It wrote the statute broadly to ensure
that it would cover all chemicals that could possibly be used as weapons
of mass destruction. But in doing so, Congress functionally delegated to
the executive the power to determine what criteria prosecutors will use to
sort cases they will prosecute from those that they will not.249
These implicit policy delegations to the executive have not been offset
by more aggressive judicial review.250 Courts have generally refused to

245
18 U.S.C. § 229. The statute was enacted to implement the United Nations Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 848–49 (2014). The
preamble of the Convention states that the “Parties to this Convention [are] [d]etermined to
act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all
types of weapons of mass destruction.” 32 I.L.M. 800, 804 (1993).
246
18 U.S.C. § 229(a).
247
Id. § 229F(1), (8). The statute specifically exempts “any individual self-defense device,
including those using a pepper spray or chemical mace.” Id. § 229C. And it also exempts
chemicals that are intended for peaceful purposes, protective purposes, and unrelated military
purposes. Id. § 229F(7).
248
See United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 154 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 572 U.S. at 846.
249
See Hessick, supra note 92, at 995–96; see also Rabin, supra note 237, at 1050–51
(documenting federal enforcement criteria for marijuana and immigration offenses). The
Supreme Court ultimately adopted a very narrow interpretation of the statute in Bond, 572
U.S. at 845–46, limiting the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act to apply only
to terrorist plots or the possession of extremely dangerous substances with the potential to
cause severe harm to many people, not to household cleaners. But that decision was not framed
as an effort to limit executive power; instead, it embodied a decision by the Court to adopt
interpretations of federal statutes that were less likely to encroach on areas of traditional state
influence. See id.
250
See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Guilty Plea (1981) (criticizing the failure of magistrates and judges to review and check
prosecutorial power); Stuntz, supra note 238 (criticizing the broad plea-bargaining power
conferred on prosecutors in Bordenkircher v. Hayes); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521 (1981) (criticizing prosecutorial discretion as
violating foundational principles of the criminal justice system and sweeping beyond the
considerations that have been used to justify the existence of the discretion); id. at 1522
(criticizing the “broad and rather casual acceptance” of this prosecutorial discretion).
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limit the arresting power,251 and they have put even fewer constraints on
the charging power of prosecutors.252 So long as they have probable
cause, prosecutors have virtually unbridled discretion whether to bring
charges.253 And if more than one statute criminalizes the same conduct,
they have complete discretion to decide under which statute to
prosecute.254 The only restrictions are that officials may not make
decisions based on a defendant’s race or religion, a desire to interfere with
a defendant’s constitutional rights, or personal animus toward the
defendant.255 But even those constraints are more bark than bite. Because
courts have erected significant barriers against obtaining discovery from
the government,256 law enforcement officers may, as a practical matter,
target defendants for unconstitutional reasons without real fear of
redress.257
One notable exception to this trend of judicial passivity has been in the
enforcement of the vagueness doctrine. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has decided a handful of cases in which it has said that a federal
statute violates the Due Process Clause because of excessive
vagueness.258 One reason that the Court has given for holding vague laws

251

See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996).
252
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“Such factors as the strength of the
case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and
the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”); United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
253
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
254
Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123–24 (“[W]hen an act violates more than one criminal statute,
the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any
class of defendants.”).
255
See Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1365, 1372 (1987) (collecting cases).
256
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
257
See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 605, 623 (1998) (“[F]or many crimes, Armstrong makes
discovery impossible even where the defendant is a victim of selective prosecution.”).
258
See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204
(2018); Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); see also Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 406–08 (2010) (adopting a limiting construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the “honest
services” statute of federal mail fraud, “to avoid constitutional difficulties” because if the

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Nondelegation and Criminal Law

335

unconstitutional is that vague statutes delegate too much of Congress’s
legislative power.259 The argument is sometimes framed as a concern that
the vague law delegates this power to the courts.260 But, as Justice
Gorsuch recently explained, the worry is not “only that vague laws risk
allowing judges to assume legislative power. Vague laws also threaten to
transfer legislative power to police and prosecutors, leaving to them the
job of shaping a vague statute’s contours through their enforcement
decisions.”261
The charging power that prosecutors wield under expansive criminal
codes, overlapping statutes, and broadly worded statutes raises similar
concerns as the delegation of rulemaking power.262 Just like delegations
of rulemaking power, implicit delegations through expansions of the
criminal code undermine accountability. When Congress sets criminal
policy through statutes, it bears responsibility for its decisions. Voters
know to blame them for unpopular laws. But when Congress lets the
executive set the “real” criminal law, responsibility is shared between
Congress and the executive, leaving voters uncertain whether to blame
Congress or the executive for unpopular decisions.263 Moreover, none of

statute “proscribe[d] a wider range of offensive conduct . . . [it] would raise the due process
concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine”).
259
See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1212 (stating that the vagueness doctrine is “a corollary of the
separation of powers—requiring that Congress, rather than the executive or judicial branch,
define what conduct is sanctionable and what is not”); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
255 U.S. 81, 92 (1921) (noting that standardless statutes “delegate legislative power”); see
also Goldsmith, supra note 14, at 284–86 (collecting cases on the delegation issue and noting
that the principle “that the separation of powers must be maintained . . . stood for decades as
the second requirement of vagueness analysis”). But see Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1248 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court’s precedents have occasionally described the vagueness doctrine
in terms of nondelegation. But they have not been consistent on this front.” (citations
omitted)).
260
See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876) (stating that it would be
dangerous if the legislature were to write a statute that “set a net large enough to catch all
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully
detained, and who should be set at large,” because it “would, to some extent, substitute the
judicial for the legislative department of the government”).
261
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1227–28 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
262
This expansive charging power also raises many of the same issues as unconstitutionally
vague laws. See generally Hessick, supra note 14.
263
For example, when charges were filed by federal prosecutors under the notoriously broad
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Members of Congress criticized prosecutors for using the
discretion given to them by the Act to bring charges in that case. Brendan Sasso & Jennifer
Martinez, Lawmakers Slam DOJ Prosecution of Swartz as ‘Ridiculous, Absurd,’ The Hill
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the executive officials who exercise the charging power is directly elected
but instead work in the Department of Justice and other federal
agencies.264 Voters accordingly cannot readily hold them accountable for
unpopular decisions.
Broad executive charging powers similarly undercut notice principles.
Executive officials need not—and ordinarily do not—publicize their
enforcement criteria or other information about how they exercise their
charging power.265 And, on those rare occasions when they do share their
enforcement criteria with the public, prosecutors insist that the criteria do
not limit their charging power; they reserve the right to bring charges even
when those criteria are not met.266 As a result, a defendant whose conduct
falls outside of that interpretation has no recourse if a prosecutor decides
to abandon those criteria in her particular case.
Given that the executive already has this broad charging discretion, one
might argue that there is no reason to prohibit delegations of rulemaking.
Indeed, one might argue that delegating the power to make administrative
crimes is, in some ways, preferable to implicit delegations expanding the
charging power. Regulations must be published, but prosecutors have no
obligation to publicize their charging policies or criteria for enforcing
(Jan. 15, 2013, 10:52 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/277353-lawmakers-blasttrumped-up-doj-prosecution-of-internet-activist [https://perma.cc/NLB9-RJWJ].
264
United States Attorneys are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, but
they are never required to stand for elections themselves. 28 U.S.C. § 541. Moreover, most
charging decisions are not made by these appointed prosecutors, but instead by the career
Assistant United States Attorneys, who are highly insulated from public pressure. See Hessick,
supra note 92, at 1003–04 (discussing the insulation of line prosecutors from democratic
accountability and political pressure).
265
See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, The National Police Association is
Throwing a Fit Over Prosecutorial Discretion, Slate (Jan. 4, 2019, 12:55 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/national-police-association-throwing-fit.html
[https://perma.cc/8AZH-G9XB] (“All prosecutors make decisions not to enforce laws. But
most do not publicize those decisions.”).
266
For example, when the Department of Justice was repeatedly asked to clarify whether it
would pursue federal charges against individuals who used or sold marijuana in states that had
repealed their marijuana laws, the Department of Justice made public a memorandum
providing guidance to U.S. Attorneys. That memorandum set forth enforcement priorities in
states that had repealed their marijuana prohibitions, and those priorities suggested that federal
prosecutors would not target sellers or buyers that complied with relevant state regulations.
But the memorandum also made clear that whatever enforcement priorities the government
set, federal prosecutors retained the power to fully enforce federal marijuana law and
individuals could not rely on the memorandum as a legal defense. See Memorandum, James
M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Guidance Regarding Federal Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29,
2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KJ7-R2R5].
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broad statutes. Moreover, the charging power arguably presents more
opportunities for prosecutorial abuse than rulemaking. Charging
decisions are retrospective. They charge individuals for alleged
infractions that occurred in the past and accordingly cannot be undone.
By contrast, rulemakings are prospective. They prescribe rules for future
conduct and accordingly provide an opportunity for individuals to avoid
breaking the law. In addition, charging decisions are tailored to
individuals, while rulemakings tend to be generally applicable.267
But the discretion afforded by charging power under expansive
criminal codes, overlapping statutes, and broadly worded statutes is an
inevitable by-product of the “executive [p]ower” that is assigned to the
President in Article II268 and the President’s duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.”269 Deciding whom to charge and what
charges to bring are quintessentially executive functions.270 Even if
Congress wrote precise laws, the executive would still make criminal
267
To be sure, officials can make generalized policies about whether to bring particular
types of charges. For example, an administration may adopt a policy against prosecuting the
possession of marijuana. But many enforcement decisions do not rest on generalized policies;
instead, they require case-by-case assessments and individualized judgment. The Department
of Justice guidelines on when prosecutors ought to decline enforcement provides an example:
In determining whether a prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest, the
attorney for the government should weigh all relevant considerations, including:
1. Federal law enforcement priorities, including any federal law
enforcement initiatives or operations aimed at accomplishing those
priorities;
2. The nature and seriousness of the offense;
3. The deterrent effect of prosecution;
4. The person’s culpability in connection with the offense;
5. The person’s history with respect to criminal activity;
6. The person’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution
of others;
7. The person’s personal circumstances;
8. The interests of any victims; and
9. The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.230 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/justicemanual [https://perma.cc/L2JK-3CWQ].
268
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. See generally Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power
Clause, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1269 (2020) (presenting historical evidence to show that the
original understanding of the term “executive power” meant the power to enforce and execute
the laws).
269
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. See generally Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111 (2019) (presenting
historical evidence to conclude that the Faithful Execution Clause imposed, inter alia, a duty
of “diligent, careful, good faith, honest, and impartial execution of law”).
270
See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.
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policy by deciding whom to prosecute and what to charge. That is not to
say that the courts are powerless to constrain the charging power,271 nor
is it to deny that Congress has gone too far in expanding the scope of
executive power by enacting expansive criminal codes, overlapping
statutes, and broadly worded statutes.272 But rather the point is that, at
least to some extent, policy judgments are inseparable from the charging
power.
By contrast, the executive’s power over criminal policy through
explicit delegations of rulemaking authority is not inevitable. Regulating
what is illegal and fixing the punishment for violations is traditionally a
legislative function, not an executive function.273 Congress need not rely
on the executive to promulgate those regulations. It could enact a statute
codifying any rule that the executive promulgated. In short, explicit
rulemaking delegations are not necessary. What is more, they are far
simpler both to identify and to prohibit.
IV. LIMITING CRIMINAL LAW DELEGATIONS
The special concerns raised by delegating the authority to make
criminal laws suggest that the usual nondelegation doctrine should not
apply in this context. Even if Congress ordinarily has broad leeway to
authorize agencies to promulgate rules, tighter restrictions should apply
to delegations authorizing agencies to make criminal rules.
The most straightforward way to implement a stricter nondelegation
doctrine on criminal laws would be a prohibition on delegations involving
criminal law.274 Such a prohibition would avoid the liberty,
accountability, and notice problems identified in Part II. And because it
is a bright-line rule, it would be relatively easy to administer.

271
“Courts often justify their refusal to review prosecutorial discretion on the ground that
separation-of-powers concerns prohibit such review . . . . But there is an enormous difference
between, on the one hand, forcing a prosecutor to charge or stripping him of authority to charge
and, on the other, regulating that authority . . . .” Vorenberg, supra note 250, at 1546.
272
See Hessick, supra note 92, at 996–1022 (arguing that these conditions have resulted in
a criminal justice system that “fails to vindicate rule-of-law values”).
273
See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
274
Cases such as Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249 (1947), United States v. Grimaud,
220 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1911), and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989),
suggest that such a delegation is always unconstitutional because it entails an impermissible
delegation of legislative power; see also Fissell, supra note 9 (arguing that all crimes defined
by administrative agencies are illegitimate).
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One might object that prohibiting those delegations would cripple our
government. The theory would be that the expansion of the economy, as
well as advances in technology and science, have vastly expanded the
topics that require national instead of regional regulation, and addressing
all those areas far exceeds Congress’s capacity. Therefore, Congress must
be able to delegate to agencies the task of regulating those matters.275 The
Gundy plurality raised a variation of this argument, stating that “if
SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is
unconstitutional.”276
But prohibiting criminal delegations would hardly have these dire
consequences. Agencies could still promulgate civil and other
administrative regulations to address social problems. Indeed, the vast
majority of agency regulations are non-criminal.
One might argue that prohibiting criminal consequences for violations
of agency regulations would not sufficiently prevent disfavored conduct.
But that is hardly clear. For one thing, the government can discourage
behavior without prohibiting it.277 For another, even if the government
wanted to prohibit certain behavior, it could enforce those prohibitions
through civil penalties, rather than through criminal punishment. Criminal
law is often thought to be necessary to prevent conduct because it
provides additional deterrence through the social stigma of conviction278
and because many criminal defendants are judgment proof.279 But
because agency regulations tend to focus on employers, industries,
providers, and other sources of market failure,280 many of the individuals
and organizations subject to agency regulations are responsive to
financial disincentives. As a result, the marginal deterrence that is
achieved through criminal penalties, as opposed to civil sanctions, is
likely to be small. In any event, even if there is some small number of
situations where the sensible agency response to a problem would require
275

See supra note 221.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019) (plurality opinion).
277
See supra text accompanying notes 230–233.
278
See, e.g., Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences,
91 Ind. L.J. 791, 808 (2016) (explaining how the stigma of conviction acts as a “fixed cost[]”
in addition to the additional costs imposed by criminal punishment).
279
See, e.g., Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against
Copyright Litigation, 84 Or. L. Rev. 1127, 1160–61 (2005) (discussing proposals to punish
copyright infringement with incarceration in order to “resolve[] the judgment-proof issue in
cases of insolvency”).
280
W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & John M. Vernon, Economics of Regulation
and Antitrust xvii (4th ed. 2005) (arguing that regulations aim to correct market failures).
276
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criminal penalties, the agency could always draft the relevant legislation
and send it to Congress so that it could be enacted.
Another objection is that it would be too complicated to administer a
regime prohibiting criminal delegations because they are often
intertwined with civil delegations. For example, some statutes authorizing
agencies to promulgate regulations prescribe both civil and criminal
penalties for violations. But this objection is overstated. One could easily
handle those prohibitions on criminal delegations simply by prohibiting
criminal punishments for violations of the regulations.
Although prohibiting all delegations involving criminal law would
solve the problems we have identified, the Supreme Court is highly
unlikely to do so. Even the Gundy dissenters did not suggest an outright
prohibition on delegations.281 Prohibiting (rather than restricting)
delegations thus might simply be too radical of a break from current
doctrine and practice.
A more moderate way to implement a stricter nondelegation doctrine
would be to adopt a more robust version of the intelligible principle
doctrine for criminal delegations.282 Congress could authorize criminal
rulemaking only if it sets forth detailed parameters to guide the
executive’s discretion in fashioning those rules. Under this approach,
Congress could not simply direct agencies to promulgate regulations “in
the public interest.” Instead, Congress would have to provide more
guidance, for example by specifying the kinds of public harms sought to
be avoided. One could modulate the strength of this restriction by
tailoring the amount of detail required in the statute.283 This approach is

281
The Gundy dissenters would have permitted delegations that “fill up the details,” depend
on fact-finding, or pertain to matters already within the executive power. 139 S. Ct. at 2135–
37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
282
The idea that a more robust intelligible principle is necessary was mentioned in Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1991). See also Alexander, supra note 9 (arguing that
courts should consider, de novo, whether a particular rule falls within the congressional
delegation to the agency). Another option would be to require statutes delegating the power to
promulgate criminal rules to include particular principles that the agencies must consider. For
example, one might require the agency to consider the retributivist and utilitarian reasons for
promulgating those rules.
283
One leery of criminal delegations could require significant detail in the statute, leaving
to the agency the relatively minor task of filling in the minutia. That person might not uphold
a statute criminalizing, for example, the use of service elevators that violate OSHA safety
regulations aimed at “protecting the public.” But he might uphold a different statute that
specified the ways in which an elevator might be unsafe—for example, if the statute made it
a crime to load a service elevator above its carrying capacity in violation of OSHA regulations,
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akin to what Justice Gorsuch suggested in his Gundy dissent—namely
that “Congress can enlist considerable assistance from the executive
branch in filling up details,” but that Congress itself must articulate the
controlling policy objectives.284
This weaker restriction has several significant drawbacks. First, like
the intelligible principle doctrine itself, the test would be unmoored from
the Constitution. The intelligible principle doctrine rests on the idea that
lawmaking is legislative if it involves unconstrained discretion, but
lawmaking is executive if it involves constrained discretion. Nothing in
the Constitution supports that distinction. And certainly, nothing in the
Constitution suggests that greater constraint on discretion is necessary to
convert criminal legislation into the exercise of executive power.
Second, a heightened intelligible principle test would maintain the
current friction between the nondelegation doctrine and the vagueness
doctrine.285 Unless the additional guidance provided by Congress to the
agency is sufficient to give the public notice of what conduct will be
prohibited, the “law” that would be used for vagueness challenges would
have to be the regulation, rather than the statute. And that is inconsistent
with the theory underlying the modern nondelegation doctrine that “the
law” is the statute which refers to agency regulations, not the regulations
themselves.286
Third, a more robust intelligible principle doctrine would be both
difficult to administer and unpredictable. The Court would have to engage
in the difficult task of deciding how much guidance is necessary. Even
more difficult, the Court would have to articulate that requirement in a
way that Congress and other courts can understand and apply. Limitations
on language, combined with the variety of different types of
circumstances covered by criminal statutes that Congress may enact,
make this task virtually impossible. Indeed, it is likely for precisely these
reasons that the Court has defanged the current intelligible principle
doctrine. By contrast, an absolute prohibition would provide a clear rule.

and the statute specified various objective factors that OSHA had to consider in assessing that
capacity.
284
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2136 (stating that this
was the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
1 (1825)).
285
See supra notes 183–93 and accompanying text.
286
See supra notes 15, 183–87 and accompanying text.
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Congress would simply be forbidden from delegating criminal
rulemaking power.
There is, however, a different approach to delegation and criminal
laws—namely, applying the void for vagueness doctrine, rather than the
intelligible principle doctrine, to congressional statutes that delegate
criminal rulemaking authority to the executive. This approach has the
virtue of allowing the Court to treat criminal law delegations differently,
while doing minimal violence to existing doctrine. It would retain the
current justification for permitting delegations, while continuing to
respect the special restrictions that the Constitution and related doctrines
place on criminal statutes. The current justification for the nondelegation
doctrine is that the law criminalizing behavior is the statute which permits
agency regulations, not the regulations themselves.287 But, as explained
above, if the relevant law is the statute, rather than the regulations, many
delegating statutes are likely unconstitutionally vague because they do not
provide notice of what is illegal and legal.288 Delegating statutes only
provide notice that someone else will determine what is illegal and legal
and the very broad principles, such as the public interest, that will be used
in making that determination.289
To be sure, using the vagueness doctrine to police criminal law
delegations is not a perfect solution. The vagueness doctrine may not
necessarily give clear guidance to Congress about how precise their
delegating statutes must be. Indeed, the vagueness doctrine has long
drawn criticism for failing to provide clear guidance to lawmakers about
how precise a law must be in order to satisfy due process.290 As a result,
the Court appears to have been inconsistent in its decisions about whether
statutory language is or is not unconstitutionally vague.291
Nor would applying the vagueness doctrine require great specificity in
delegating statutes. The Supreme Court often permits a significant
amount of imprecision in criminal statutes without declaring those
statutes unconstitutionally vague. For example, many statutes criminalize
certain conduct only if it creates an “unreasonable risk” or a “substantial
287

See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 188–192.
289
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
290
See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“‘[I]ndefiniteness’ is not a quantitative concept. It is not even a technical concept of definite
components. It is itself an indefinite concept.”).
291
See Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 87, at 371–72 (contrasting United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) with Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)).
288
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risk.”292 But what distinguishes a reasonable risk or an insubstantial risk
from an unreasonable or a substantial risk? The answer to that question
probably changes from person to person. And so criminal laws that use
such terms require people to guess whether prosecutors or jurors will
think about the reasonableness of a risk they took or how substantial the
risk was.293 Yet the Supreme Court confirmed as recently as 2015 that
such laws are constitutional.294
Despite these caveats, subjecting criminal law delegations to the
vagueness doctrine is attractive because it would impose at least some
constraints on criminal delegations. In particular, it would ensure more
notice for the public, make Congress more accountable for
criminalization decisions, and decrease the amount of and the speed at
which new criminal prohibitions are adopted. And although these
constraints might not be particularly robust, the imprecision permitted
under the vagueness doctrine may actually be considered a virtue rather
than a vice—at least by some. And, in any event, any weakness or
inconsistency in the vagueness test are problems with the vagueness
doctrine itself; they are not unique to using the doctrine to police criminal
law delegations.
Establishing that tighter restrictions ought to apply to the delegation of
criminal rulemaking authority is merely the beginning of the
conversation. Even if the Court were to agree to impose tighter
restrictions, important questions would remain unanswered. For example,
one would still have to determine to which criminal delegations those
restrictions would apply. Delegations of criminal authority come in three
potential forms. Statutes may authorize agencies to criminalize a legal
violation, to dictate what conduct violates criminal laws, or to set the
punishment for criminal violations. All three types of statutes raise
concerns about liberty, accountability, and notice—as reflected by the
Supreme Court’s periodic statements condemning each type of
delegation. Arguments for heightened restrictions on delegation apply to
all three types of statutes, but one can draw distinctions between them.

292

See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 1a-99a, Johnson v. United States, 576
U.S. 591 (2015) (No. 13-7120) (collecting federal and state statutes).
293
Nash, 229 U.S. at 377 (“[T]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his
estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.”).
294
Johnson, 576 U.S. at 603–04.
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In any event, we cannot begin to answer these questions until the Court
finally grapples with the many reasons that criminal delegations ought to
be treated differently than non-criminal delegations.
CONCLUSION
Gundy erred in applying the same nondelegation test to criminal law.
Foundational principles of criminal law and administrative law tell us that
delegation of criminal rulemaking power is more problematic than noncriminal delegations. And the theory that has been used to justify broad
delegations is inconsistent with constitutional doctrine requiring more
care in the enactment of criminal laws.
Indeed, it is hard to square the Supreme Court’s failure to treat criminal
delegations differently with its recent enthusiasm for striking down
statutes as unconstitutionally vague.295 It is not simply that the vagueness
doctrine creates problems with the theory that the Court uses to justify its
permissive nondelegation doctrine. In addition, the vagueness doctrine is
designed to protect many of the same interests as a more robust
nondelegation doctrine.296 To be sure, the vagueness doctrine is largely
couched in terms of the protection of individual rights, while the
nondelegation doctrine is generally explained as a structural protection.
Perhaps it is this different framing—individual rights versus structural
protections—that has led most of the Justices to embrace only one of these
two doctrines.297
Or perhaps the perceived stakes of delegation simply overshadow other
doctrinal commitments. Some believe that broad delegations are

295

See supra notes 285–286 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 106, 180–182 and accompanying text.
297
For example, in United States v. Davis, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor
embraced the restrictions of the vagueness doctrine. 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323 (2019). Davis was
decided only 4 days after Gundy, in which those same Justices rejected limits on broad
delegations. 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019). Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Alito dissented in Davis, rejecting the restrictions of the vagueness doctrine. 139 S. Ct. at
2336–38, 2355. But they embraced—or expressed willingness to embrace—stronger limits on
congressional delegations in Gundy. 139 S. Ct. at 2130–31. Only Justice Gorsuch was willing
to embrace both the vagueness doctrine in Davis and a stricter nondelegation doctrine in
Gundy. Id. at 2131; Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2323.
296
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necessary in order to ensure a functioning modern government.298 Others
believe those delegations lead to excessive regulation.299
But the Justices ought to be able to find a middle ground when it comes
to the delegation of criminal rulemaking authority. Those delegations are
inconsistent with foundational criminal law principles, they present
greater threats to the principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine,
and they are not well supported by the ordinary arguments in favor of
delegation. Consequently, the Court could easily draw a principled line
that restrains criminal delegations while preserving permissive
delegations in other administrative law contexts.
Criminal law delegations are different, and so we can—and should—
treat them differently.

298

See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 221, at 341–42 (arguing that delegation is necessary to meet
needs of modern society).
299
Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1585, 1612 (2012)
(recounting the argument that “delegating lawmaking power to executive agencies[] enables
the production of a surfeit of complex federal regulations that would not otherwise exist”).

